On The Poverty of Student Life

 Mustapha Khayati

 

[First published in 1966 at the University of Strasbourg by students of the university and members of the Internationale Situationniste. A few students elected to the student union printed 10,000 copies with university funds. The copies were distributed at the official ceremony marking the beginning of the academic year. The student union was promptly closed by court order. HUG reproduces a section from the pamphlet.]

We might very well say, and no one will disgaree with us, that the student is the most universally despised creature in France, apart from the priest and the policeman. Naturally he is usually attacked from the wrong point of view, with specious reasons derived from the ruling ideology. He may be worth the contempt of a true revolutionary, yet a revolutionary critique of the student situation is currently taboo on the official Left. The licensed and impotent opponents of capitalism repress the obvious–that what is wrong with the students is also what is wrong with them. They convert their unconscious contempt into a blind enthusiasm. The radical intelligentsia (from Les Temps Modernes to L’Express) prostrates itself before the so-called “rise of the student” and the declining bureaucracies of the Left (from the “Communist” party to the Stalinist National Union of Students) bids noisily for his moral and material support.

There are reasons for this sudden enthusiasm, but they are all provided by the present form of capitalism, in its overdeveloped state. We shall use this pamphlet for denunciation. We shall expose these reasons one by one, on the principle that the end of alienation is only reached by the straight and narrow path of alienation itself.

Up to now, studies of student life have ignored the essential issue. The surveys and analyses have all been psychological or sociological or economic: in other words, academic exercises, content with the false categories of one specialization or another. None of them can achieve what is most needed–a view of modern society as a whole. Fourier denounced their error long ago as the attempt to apply scientific laws to the basic assumptions of the science (“porter régulièrement sur les questions primordiales”). Everything is said about our society except what it is, and the nature of its two basic principles–the commodity and the spectacle. The fetishism of facts masks the essential category, and the details consign the totality to oblivion.

Modern capitalism and its spectacle allot everyone a specific role in a general passivity. The student is no exception to the rule. He has a provisional part to play, a rehearsal for his final role as an element in market society as conservative as the rest. Being a student is a form of initiation. An initiation which echoes the rites of more primitive societies with bizarre precision. It goes on outside of history, cut off from social reality. The student leads a double life, poised between his present status and his future role. The two are absolutely separate, and the journey from one to the other is a mechanical event “in the future.” Meanwhile, he basks in a schizophrenic consciousness, withdrawing into his initiation group to hide from that future. Protected from history, the present is a mystic trance.

At least in consciousness, the student can exist apart from the official truths of “economic life.” But for very simple reasons: looked at economically, student life is a hard one. In our society of abundance,” he is still a pauper. 80% of students come from income groups well above the working class, yet 90% have less money than the meanest laborer Student poverty is an anachronism, a throw-back from an earlier age of capitalism; it does not share in the new poverties of the spectacular societies; it has yet to attain the new poverty of the new proletariat. Nowadays the teenager shuffles off the moral prejudices and authority of the family to become part of the market even before he is adolescent: at fifteen he has all the delights of being directly exploited. In contrast the student covets his protracted infancy as an irresponsible and docile paradise. Adolescence and its crises may bring occasional brushes with his family, but in essence he is not troublesome: he agrees to be treated as a baby by the institutions which provide his education. (If ever they stop screwing his arse off, it’s only to come round and kick him in the balls.)

“There is no student problem.” Student passivity is only the most obvious symptom of a general state of affairs, for each sector of social life has been subdued by a similar imperialism.

Our social thinkers have a bad conscience about the student problem, but only because the real problem is the poverty and servitude of all. But we have different reasons to despise the student and all his works. What is unforgivable is not so much his actual misery but his complaisance in the face of the misery of others. For him there is only one real alienation: his own. He is a full-time and happy consumer of that commodity, hoping to arouse at least our pity, since he cannot claim our interest. By the logic of modern capitalism, most students can only become mere petits cadres (with the same function in neo-capitalism as the skilled worker had in the nineteenth-century economy). The student really knows how miserable will be that golden future which is supposed to make up for the shameful poverty of the present. In the face of that knowledge, he prefers to dote on the present and invent an imaginary prestige for himself. After all, there will be no magical compensation for present drabness: tomorrow will be like yesterday, lighting these fools the way to dusty death. Not unnaturally he takes refuge in an unreal present.

The student is a stoic slave: the more chains authority heaps upon him, the freer he is in phantasy. He shares with his new family, the University, a belief in a curious kind of autonomy. Real independence, apparently, lies in a direct subservience to the two most powerful systems of social control: the family and the State. He is their well-behaved and grateful child, and like the submissive child he is overeager to please. He celebrates all the values and mystifications of the system, devouring them with all the anxiety of the infant at the breast. Once, the old illusions had to be imposed on an aristocracy of labour; the petits cadres-to-be ingest them willingly under the guise of culture.

There are various forms of compensation for poverty. The total poverty of ancient societies produced the grandiose compensation of religion. The student’s poverty by contrast is a marginal phenomenon, and he casts around for compensations among the most down-at-heel images of the ruling class. He is a bore who repairs the old jokes of an alienated culture. Even as an ideologist, he is always out of date. One and all, his latest enthusiasms were ridiculous thirty years ago.

Once upon a time the universities were respected; the student persists in the belief that he is lucky to be there. But he arrived too late. The bygone excellence of bourgeois culture (By this we mean the culture of a Hegel or of the encyclopédistes, rather than the Sorbonne and the Ecole Normale Supérieure.) has vanished. A mechanically produced specialist is now the goal of the “educational system.” A modern economic system demands mass production of students who are not educated and have been rendered incapable of thinking. Hence the decline of the universities and the automatic nullity of the student once he enters its portals. The university has become a society for the propagation of ignorance; “high culture” has taken on the rhythm of the production line; without exception, university teachers are cretins, men who would get the bird from any audience of schoolboys. But all this hardly matters: the important thing is to go on listening respectfully. In time, if critical thinking is repressed with enough conscientiousness, the student will come to partake of the wafer of knowledge, the professor will tell him the final truths of the world. Till then–a menopause of the spirit. As a matter of course the future revolutionary society will condemn the doings of lecture theatre and faculty as mere noise–socially undesirable. The student is already a very bad joke.

The student is blind to the obvious–that even his closed world is changing. The “crisis of the university”–that detail of a more general crisis of modern capitalism–is the latest fodder for the deaf-mute dialogue of the specialists. This “crisis” is simple to understand: the difficulties of a specialised sector which is adjusting(too late) to a general change in the relations of production. There was once a vision–if an ideological one–of a liberal bourgeois university. But as its social base disappeared, the vision became banality. In the age of free-trade capitalism, when the “liberal” state left it its marginal freedoms, the university could still think of itself as an independent power. Of course it was a pure and narrow product of that society’s needs–particularly the need to give the privileged minority an adequate general culture before they rejoined the ruling class (not that going up to university was straying very far from class confines). But the bitterness of the nostalgic don (No one dares any longer to speak in the name of nineteenth century liberalism; so they reminisce about the “free” and “popular” universities of the middle ages–that “democracy of “liberal”.) is understandable: better, after all, to be the bloodhound of the haute bourgeoisie than sheepdog to the world’s white-collars. Better to stand guard on privilege than harry the flock into their allotted factories and bureaux, according to the whims of the “planned economy”. The university is becoming, fairly smoothly, the honest broker of technocracy and its spectacle. In the process, the purists of the academic Right become a pitiful sideshow, purveying their ” universal” cultural goods to a bewildered audience of specialists.

More serious, and thus more dangerous, are the modernists of the Left and the Students’ Union, with their talk of a “reform of University structure” and a “reinsertion of the University into social and economic life”, i.e., its adaptation to the needs of modern capitalism. The one-time suppliers of general culture to the ruling classes, though still guarding their old prestige, must be converted into the forcing-house of a new labor aristocracy. Far from contesting the historical process which subordinates one of the last relatively autonomous social groups to the demands of the market, the progressives complain of delays and inefficiency in its completion. They are the standard-bearers of the cybernetic university of the future ( which has already reared its ugly head in some unlikely quarters). And they are the enemy: the fight against the market, which is starting again in earnest, means the fight against its latest lackeys.

As for the student, this struggle is fought out entirely over his head, somewhere in the heavenly realm of his masters. The whole of his life is beyond his control, and for all he sees of the world he might as well be on another planet. His acute economic poverty condemns him to a paltry form of survival. But, being a complacent creature, he parades his very ordinary indigence as if it were an original lifestyle: self-indulgently, he affects to be a Bohemian. The Bohemian solution is hardly viable at the best of times, and the notion that it could be achieved without a complete and final break with the university milieu is quite ludicrous. But the student Bohemian (and every student likes to pretend that he is a Bohemian at heart) clings to his false and degraded version of individual revolt. He is so “eccentric” that he continues–thirty years after Reich’s excellent lessons–to entertain the most traditional forms of erotic behavior, reproducing at this level the general relations of class society. Where sex is concerned, we have learnt better tricks from elderly provincial ladies. His rent-a-crowd militancy for the latest good cause is an aspect of his real impotence.

The student’s old-fashioned poverty, however, does put him at a potential advantage–if only he could see it. He does have marginal freedoms, a small area of liberty which as yet escapes the totalitarian control of the spectacle. His flexible working-hours permit him adventure and experiment. But he is a sucker for punishment and freedom scares him to death: he feels safer in the straight-jacketed space-time of lecture hall and weekly “essay . He is quite happy with this open prison organized for his “benefit”, and, though not constrained, as are most people, to separate work and leisure, he does so of his own accord–hypocritically proclaiming all the while his contempt for assiduity and grey men. He embraces every available contradiction and then mutters darkly about the “difficulties of communication” from the uterine warmth of his religious, artistic or political clique.

Driven by his freely-chosen depression, he submits himself to the subsidiary police force of psychiatrists set up by the avant-garde of repression. The university mental health clinics are run by the student mutual organization, which sees this institution as a grand victory for student unionism and social progress. Like the Aztecs who ran to greet Cortes’s sharpshooters, and then wondered what made the thunder and why men fell down, the students flock to the psycho-police stations with their “problems”.

The real poverty of his everyday life finds its immediate, phantastic compensation in the opium of cultural commodities. In the cultural spectacle he is allotted his habitual role of the dutiful disciple. Although he is close to the production-point, access to the Sanctuary of Thought is forbidden, and he is obliged to discover “modern culture” as an admiring spectator. Art is dead, but the student is necrophiliac. He peeks at the corpse in cine-clubs and theaters, buys its fish-fingers from the cultural supermarket. Consuming unreservedly, he is in his element: he is the living proof of all the platitudes of American market research: a conspicuous consumer, complete with induced irrational preference for Brand X (Camus, for example), and irrational prejudice against Brand Y (Sartre, perhaps).

Impervious to real passions, he seeks titillation in the battles between his anaemic gods, the stars of a vacuous heaven: AIthusser — Garaudy-Barthes — Picard — Lefebvre — Levi-Strauss — Halliday-deChardin — Brassens… and between their rival theologies, designed like all theologies to mask the real problems by creating false ones: humanism — existentialism — scientism — structuralism — cyberneticism — new criticism — dialectics-of-naturism — meta-philosophism…

He thinks he is avant-garde if he has seen the latest happening. He discovers “modernity” as fast as the market can produce its ersatz version of long outmoded (though once important) ideas; for him, every rehash is a cultural revolution. His principal concern is status, and he eagerly snaps up all the paperback editions of important and “difficult” texts with which mass culture has filled the bookstores. (If he had an atom of self-respect or lucidity, he would knock them off. But no: conspicuous consumers always pay!). Unfortunately, he cannot read, so he devours them with his gaze, and enjoys them vicariously through the gaze of his friends. He is an other-directed voyeur.

His favorite reading matter is the kitsch press, whose task it is to orchestrate the consumption of cultural nothing-boxes. Docile as ever, the student accepts its commercial ukases and makes them the only measuring-rod of his tastes. Typically, he is a compulsive reader of weeklies like le Nouvel Observateur and l’Express (whose nearest English equivalents are the posh Sundays and New Society). He generally feels that le Monde–whose style he finds somewhat difficult–is a truly objective newspaper. And it is with such guides that he hopes to gain an understanding of the modern world and become a political initiate!

In France more than anywhere else, the student is passively content to be politicized. In this sphere too, he readily accepts the same alienated, spectacular participation. Seizing upon all the tattered remnants of a Left which was annihilated more than forty years ago by “socialist” reformism and Stalinist counter-revolution, he is once more guilty of an amazing ignorance. The Right is well aware of the defeat of the workers’ movement, and so are the workers themselves, though more confusedly. But the students continue blithely to organize demonstrations which mobilize students and students only. This is political false consciousness in its virgin state, a fact which naturally makes the universities a happy hunting ground for the manipulators of the declining bureaucratic organizations. For them, it is child’s play to program the student’s political options. Occasionally there are deviationary tendencies and cries of “Independence!” but after a period of token resistance the dissidents are reincorporated into a status quo which they have never really radically opposed. The “Jeunesses Communistes Révolutionnaires,” whose title is a case of ideological falsification gone mad (they are neither young, nor communist, nor revolutionary), have with much brio and accompanying publicity defied the iron hand of the Party…but only to rally cheerily to the pontifical battle-cry, “Peace in Vietnam!”

The student prides himself on his opposition to the “archaic” Gaullist régime. But he justifies his criticism by appealing–without realizing it–to older and far worse crimes. His radicalism prolongs the life of the different currents of edulcorated Stalinism: Togliatti’s, Garaudy’s, Krushchev’s, Mao’s, etc. His youth is synonymous with appalling naiveté;, and his attitudes are in reality far more archaic than the régime’s–the Gaullists do after all understand modern society well enough to administer it.

But the student, sad to say, is not deterred by the odd anachronism. He feels obliged to have general ideas on everything, to unearth a coherent world-view capable of lending meaning to his need for activism and asexual promiscuity. As a result, he falls prey to the last doddering missionary efforts of the churches. He rushes with atavistic ardor to adore the putrescent carcass of God, and cherishes all the stinking detritus of prehistoric religions in the tender belief that they enrich him and his time. Along with their sexual rivals, those elderly provincial ladies, the students form the social category with the highest percentage of admitted adherents to these archaic cults. Everywhere else, the priests have been either beaten off or devoured, but university clerics shamelessly continue to bugger thousands of students in their spiritual shithouses.

We must add in all fairness that there do exist students of a tolerable intellectual level, who without difficulty dominate the controls designed to check the mediocre capacity demanded from the others. They do so for the simple reason that they have understood the system, and so despise it and know themselves to be its enemies. They are in the system for what they can get out of it–particularly grants. Exploiting the contradiction which, for the moment at least, ensures the maintenance of a small sector–”research”–still governed by a liberal-academic rather than a technocratic rationality, they calmly carry the germs of sedition to the highest level: their open contempt for the organization is the counterpart of a lucidity which enables them to outdo the system’s lackeys, intellectually and otherwise. Such students cannot fail to become theorists of the coming revolutionary movement. For the moment, they make no secret of the fact that what they take so easily from the system shall be used for its overthrow.

The student, if he rebels at all, must first rebel against his studies, though the necessity of this initial move is felt less spontaneously by him than by the worker, who intuitively identifies his work with his total condition. At the same time, since the student is a product of modern society just like Godard or Coca-Cola, his extreme alienation can only be fought through the struggle against this whole society. It is clear that the university can in no circumstances become the battlefield; the student, insofar as he defines himself as such, manufactures a pseudo-value which must become an obstacle to any clear consciousness of the reality of his dispossession. The best criticism of student life is the behavior of the rest of youth, who have already started to revolt. Their rebellion has become one of the signs of a fresh struggle against modern society.

After years of slumber and permanent counterrevolution, there are signs of a new period of struggle, with youth as the new carriers of revolutionary infection. But the society of the spectacle paints its own picture of itself and its enemies, imposes its own ideological categories on the world and its history. Fear is the very last response. For everything that happens is reassuringly part of the natural order of things. Real historical changes, which show that this society can be superseded, are reduced to the status of novelties, processed for mere consumption. The revolt of youth against an imposed and “given” way of life is the first sign of a total subversion. It is the prelude to a period of revolt–the revolt of those who can no longer live in our society. Faced with a danger, ideology and its daily machinery perform the usual inversion of reality. An historical process becomes a pseudo-category of some socio-natural science: the Idea of Youth.

Youth is in revolt, but this is only the eternal revolt of youth; every generation espouses “good causes,” only to forget them when “the young man begins the serious business of production and is given concrete and real social aims,” After the social scientists come the journalists with their verbal inflation. The revolt is contained by overexposure: we are given it to contemplate so that we shall forget to participate. In the spectacle, a revolution becomes a social aberration–in other words a social safety valve–which has its part to play in the smooth working of the system. It reassures because it remains a marginal phenomenon, in the apartheid of the temporary problems of a healthy pluralism (compare and contrast the “woman question” and the “problem of racialism”). In reality, if there is a problem of youth in modern capitalism it is part of the total crisis of that society. It is just that youth feels the crisis most acutely.

Youth and its mock freedoms are the purest products of modern society. Their modernity consists in the choice they are offered and are already making: total integration to neo-capitalism, or the most radical refusal. What is surprising is not that youth is in revolt but that its elders are so soporific. But the reason is history, not biology– the previous generation lived through the defeats and were sold the lies of the long, shameful disintegration of the revolutionary movement.

In itself Youth is a publicity myth, and as part of the new “social dynamism” it is the potential ally of the capitalist mode of production. The illusory primacy of youth began with the economic recovery after the second world war. Capital was able to strike a new bargain with labor: in return for the mass production of a new class of manipulable consumers, the worker was offered a role which gave him full membership of the spectacular society. This at least was the ideal social model, though as usual it bore little relation to socio-economic reality (which lagged behind the consumer ideology). The revolt of youth was the first burst of anger at the persistent realities of the new world–the boredom of everyday existence, the dead life which is still the essential product of modern capitalism, in spite of all its modernizations. A small section of youth is able to refuse that society and its products, but without any idea that this society can be superseded. They opt for a nihilist present. Yet the destruction of capitalism is once again a real issue, an event in history, a process which has already begun. Dissident youth must achieve the coherence of a critical theory, and the practical organization of that coherence.

At the most primitive level, the “delinquents” (blousons noirs) of the world use violence to express their rejection of society and its sterile options, But their refusal is an abstract one: it gives them no chance of actually escaping the contradictions of the system. They are its products–negative, spontaneous, but none the less exploitable, All the experiments of the new social order produce them: they are the first side-effects of the new urbanism; of the disintegration of all values; of the extension of an increasingly boring consumer leisure; of the growing control of every aspect of everyday life by the psycho-humanist po- lice force; and of the economic survival of a family unit which has lost all significance.

The “young thug” despises work but accepts the goods. He wants what the spectacle offers him– but now, with no down payment. This is the essential contradiction of the delinquent’s existence. He may try for a real freedom in the use of his time, in an individual assertiveness, even in the construction of a kind of community. But the contradiction remains, and kills. (On the fringe of society, where poverty reigns, the gang develops its own hierarchy, which can only fulfill itself in a war with other gangs, isolating each group and each individual within the group.) In the end the contradiction proves unbearable. Either the lure of the product world proves too strong, and the hooligan decides to do his honest day’s work: to this end a whole sector of production is devoted specifically to his recuperation. Clothes, records, guitars, scooters, transistors, purple hearts beckon him to the land of the consumer. Or else he is forced to attack the laws of the market itself–either in the primary sense, by stealing, or by a move towards a conscious revolutionary critique of commodity society. For the delinquent only two futures are possible: revolutionary consciousness, or blind obedience on the shop floor.

The Provos are the first organization of delinquency–they have given the delinquent experience its first political form. They are an alliance of two distinct elements: a handful of careerists from the degenerate world of “art,” and a mass of beatniks looking for a new activity. The artists contributed the idea of the game, though still dressed up in various threadbare ideological garments. The delinquents had nothing to offer but the violence of their rebellion. From the start the two tendencies hardly mixed: the pre-ideological mass found itself under the Bolshevik “guidance” of the artistic ruling class, who justified and maintained their power by an ideology of provo-democracy. At the moment when the sheer violence of the delinquent had become an idea–an attempt to destroy art and go beyond it–the violence was channeled into the crassest neo-artistic reformism. The Proves are an aspect of the last reformism produced by modern capitalism: the reformism of everyday life. Like Bernstein, with his vision of socialism built by tinkering with capitalism, the Provo hierarchy think they can change everyday life by a few well-chosen improvements. What they fail to realize is that the banality of everyday life is not incidental, but the central mechanism and product of modern capitalism. To destroy it, nothing less is needed than all-out revolution. The Proves choose the fragmentary and end by accepting the totality.

To give themselves a base, the leaders have concocted the paltry ideology of the provotariat (a politico-artistic salad knocked up from the leftovers of a feast they had never known). The new provotariat is supposed to oppose the passive and “bourgeois” proletariat, still worshipped in obscure Leftist shrines. Because they despair of the fight for a total change in society, they despair of the only forces which can bring about that change. The proletariat is the motor of capitalist society, and thus its mortal enemy: everything is designed for its suppression (parties; trade union bureaucracies; the police; the colonization of all aspects of everyday life) because it is the only really menacing force. The Proves hardly try to understand any of this; and without a critique of the system of production, they remain its servants. In the end an’ anti-union workers demonstration sparked off the real conflict. The Prove base went back to direct violence, leaving their bewildered leaders to denounce “excesses” and appeal to pacifist sentiments. The Proves, who had talked of provoking authority to reveal its repressive character, finished by complaining that they had been provoked by the police. So much for their pallid anarchism.

It is true that the Provo base became revolutionary in practice. But to invent a revolutionary consciousness their first task is to destroy their leaders, to rally the objective revolutionary forces of the proletariat, and to drop the Constants and deVries of this world (one the favorite artist of the Dutch royal family, the ether a failed M.P. and admirer of the English police). There is a modern revolution, and one of its bases could be the Proves–but only without their leaders and ideology. If they want to change the world, they must get rid of these who are content to paint it white.

Idle reader, your cry of “What about Berkeley?” escapes us not. True, American society needs its students; and by revolting against their studies they have automatically called that society in question. From the start they have seen their revolt against the university hierarchy as a revolt against the whole hierarchical system, the dictatorship of the economy and the State. Their refusal to become an integrated part of the commodity economy, to put their specialized studies to their obvious and inevitable use, is a revolutionary gesture. It puts in doubt that whole system of production which alienates activity and its products from their creators. For all its confusion and hesitancy, the American student movement has discovered one truth of the new refusal: that a coherent revolutionary alternative can and must be found within the “affluent society.” The movement is still fixated on two relatively accidental aspects of the American crisis–the Negroes and Vietnam–and the mini-groups of the New Left suffer from the fact. There is an authentic whiff of democracy in their chaotic organization, but what they lack is a genuine subversive content. Without it they continually fall into dangerous contradictions. They may be hostile to the traditional politics of the old parties; but the hostility is futile, and will be recuperated, so long as it is based on ignorance of the political system and naive illusions about the world situation. Abstract opposition to their own society produces facile sympathy with its apparent enemies– the so-called Socialist bureaucracies of China and Cuba. A group like Resurgence Youth Movement can in the same breath condemn the State and praise the “Cultural Revolution”–that pseudo-revolt directed by the most elephantine bureaucracy of modern times.

At the same time, these organizations, with their blend of libertarian, political and religious tendencies, are always liable to the obsession with “group dynamics” which leads to the closed world of the sect. The mass consumption of drugs is the expression of a real poverty and a protest against it; but it remains a false search for “freedom” within a world dedicated to repression, a religious critique of a world that has no need for religion, least of all a new one. The beatniks–that right wing of the youth revolt–are the main purveyors of an ideological “refusal” combined with an acceptance of the most fantastic superstitions (Zen, spiritualism, “New Church” mysticism, and the stale porridge of Ghandi-ism and humanism). Worse still, in their search for a revolutionary program the American students fall into the same bad faith as the Provos, and proclaim themselves “the most exploited class in our society.” They must understand one thing: there are no “special” student interests in revolution. Revolution will be made by all the victims of encroaching repression and the tyranny of the market.

An for the East, bureaucratic totalitarianism is beginning to produce its own forces of negation. Nowhere is the revolt of youth more violent and more savagely repressed–the rising tide of press denunciation and the new police measures against “hooliganism” are proof enough. A section of youth, so the right-minded “socialist” functionaries tell us, have no respect for moral and family order (which still flourishes there in its most detestable bourgeois forms). They prefer “debauchery,” despise work and even disobey the party police. The USSR has set up a special ministry to fight the new delinquency.

Alongside this diffuse revolt a more specific opposition is emerging. Groups and clandestine reviews rise and fall with the barometer of police repression. So far the most important has been the publication of the “open letter to the Polish Workers Party” by the young Poles Kuron and Modzelewski, which affirmed the necessity of “abolishing the present system of production and social relations” and that to do this “revolution is unavoidable.” The Eastern intellectuals have one great task–to make conscious the concrete critical action of the workers of East Berlin, Warsaw and Budapest: the proletarian critique of the dictatorship of the bureaucracy. In the East the problem is not to define the aims of revolution, but to learn how to fight for them. In the West struggle may be easy, but the goals are left obscure or ideological; in the Eastern bureaucracies there are no illusions about what is being fought for: hence the bitterness of the struggle. What is difficult is to devise the forms revolution must take in the immediate future.

In Britain, the revolt of youth found its first expression in the peace movement. It was never a whole-hearted struggle, with the misty non-violence of the Committee of 100 as its most daring program, At its strongest the Committee could call 300,000 demonstrators on to the streets, It had its finest hour in Spring 1963 with the “Spies for Peace” scandal. But it had already entered on a definitive decline: for want of a theory the unilateralists fell among the traditional Left or were recuperated by the Pacifist conscience.

What is left is the enduring (quintessentially English) archaisms in the control of everyday life, and the accelerating decomposition of the old secular values. These could still produce a total critique of the new life; but the revolt of youth needs allies. The British working class remains one of the most militant in the world. Its struggles–the shop stewards movement and the growing tempo and bitterness of wildcat strikes–will be a permanent sore on an equally permanent capitalism until it regains its revolutionary perspective, and seeks common cause with the new opposition. The débâcle of Laborism makes that alliance all the more possible and all the more necessary. If it came about, the explosion could destroy the old society–the Amsterdam riots would be child’s play in comparison. Without it, both sides of the revolution can only be stillborn: practical needs will find no genuine revolutionary form, and rebellious discharge will ignore the only forces that drive and can therefore destroy modern capitalism.

Japan is the only industrialized country where this fusion of student youth and working class militants has already taken place.

Zengakuren, the organization of revolutionary students, and the League of Young Marxist Workers joined to form the backbone of the Communist Revolutionary League. The movement is already setting and solving the new problems of revolutionary organization. Without illusions, it fights both western capitalism and the bureaucracies of the so-called socialist states. Without hierarchies, it groups together several thousand students and workers on a democratic basis, and aims at the participation of every member in all the activities of the organization.

They are the first to carry the struggle on to the streets, holding fast to a real revolutionary program, and with a mass participation. Thousands of workers and students have waged a violent struggle with the Japanese police. In many ways the C.R.L. lacks a complete and concrete theory of the two systems it fights with such ferocity. It has not yet defined the precise nature of bureaucratic exploitation, and it has hardly formulated the character of modern capitalism, the critique of everyday life and the critique of the spectacle. The Communist Revolutionary League is still fundamentally an avant-garde political organization, the heir of the best features of the classic proletarian movement. But it is at present the most important group in the world–and should henceforth be one of the poles of discussion and a rallying point for the new proletarian critique.

“To be avant-garde means to keep abreast of reality” (Internationale Situationniste 8). A radical critique of the modern world must have the totality as its object and objective. Its searchlight must reveal the world’s real past, its present existence and the prospects for its transformation as an indivisible whole. If we are to reach the whole truth about the modern world–and a fortori if we are to formulate the project of its total subversion–we must be able to expose its hidden history; in concrete terms this means subjecting the history of the international revolutionary movement, as set in motion over a century ago by the western proletariat, to a demystified and critical scrutiny.

“This movement against the total organization of the old world came to a stop long ago” (Internationale Situationniste 1). It failed. Its last historical appearance was in the Spanish social revolution, crushed in the Barcelona “May Days” of 1937. Yet its so-called “victories” and “defeats,” if judged in the light of their historical consequences, tend to confirm Liebknecht’s remark, the day before his assassination, that “some defeats are really victories, while some victories are more shameful than any defeat.” Thus the first great “failure” of workers’ power, the Paris Commune, is in fact its first great success, whereby the primitive proletariat proclaimed its historical capacity to organize all aspects of social life freely. And the Bolshevik revolution, hailed as the proletariat’s first great triumph, turns out in the last analysis to be its most disastrous defeat.

The First Strawberries in India

John Plotz

Born, bred, and married in India, the octogenarian Harriet Tytler in 1903 still described herself and her fellow Anglo-Indians as “exiles in a foreign land” . That obdurate refusal of Indianness may help explain why one of her most vivid memories is of being taken, at age eight, to see

“the first strawberry plants that ever grew in India. . . .  Two of the plants had one ripe berry each. Of course, everyone was delighted at the novel sight. No one touched them, but all expressed the desire to be Lord Auckland to have the pleasure of eating the first Indian strawberries. . . . No sooner had my father and his friends gone on, chatting away, than I thought I really must taste the strawberries. Accordingly, I picked and ate them both.”

Born in a land she cannot conceive of as her own and raised to idolize a country she knows only through words, pictures, and stories, Tytler cannot resist the chance to ingest England.

Tytler’s strawberry theft exemplifies one of the cultural practices that allowed self-styled exiles to think of England as a tangible alma mater rather than a distant speck on the map. Such long-distance attachment allowed Anglo-Indians to overlook their Indian surroundings, and attests to the importance, in an imperial “contact zone,” of what I will call cultural portability. Tytler’s strawberries were sentimental objects in the service of a powerful national ideology not hindered but helped by the fact that the nation it served was thousands of miles away.

Amartya Sen has recently proposed dividing European writing on and in India into three categories: “exoticist,” “magisterial,” and “curatorial”,  but a fourth category, which might be labeled “willfully inattentive,” usefully describes some of the most memorable and widely circulated pieces of Anglo-Indian prose. These texts—among them Julia Maitland’s Letters from Madras During the Years 1836–1839 (1843); Overland, Inland, and Upland (1873) by A. U.; and Emily Eden’s Up the Country (1866)—helped to establish what might be described as a cordon of inattention, a boundary that allowed English readers to imagine India principally via the sufferings of Anglo-Indians. The writers of these texts feel connected to fellow exiles, and detached from Indians, precisely by their very sense of geographic and social dislocation—the sense that they, like the strawberries plucked by the eight-year-old Tytler, have been transplanted.

It is fascinating to chart how certain objects and cultural practices became repositories of mobile memory in Victorian Britain and so worked to unify an otherwise disparate global community. In an era of iPods, Blackberries, and the omnipresent and endlessly personalizable internet, it may be difficult to think of portability as a Victorian phenomenon. Nonetheless, the vast Anglophone realm that Charles Dilke in 1868 labeled “Greater Britain” was the forcing bed from which portability emerged as a new way of imagining community, national identity, and even liberal selfhood on the move. It was in the Victorian era that William Shakespeare and Jane Austen became reassuring embodiments of “dear old England” for nostalgic expatriates, and that afternoon tea on a foreign verandah came to stand in for Britain herself—although the tea might be Indian and the willow-ware cups Chinese.

In evoking the culture sustained by this portable property—at once mobile and durable—one would like to complicate Marx’s account of modernity: the nineteenth-century upsurge in worldwide commodity exchange engendered not only fluidity but a heightened commitment to durable, if moveable repositories of non-fiscal value. All that was solid did not melt into air.

Culturally resonant objects and practices preserved—and even produced—a sense of self and community in situations of long-distance dislocation. Indeed, commodity exchanges that seemed to dissolve everything they touched in fact required the hypostatization of an alternative network through which protected objects, practices, and even beings, could move. Like Trollope’s Eustace Diamonds or the “portable property” that Wemmick tells Pip to “get hold of” in Great Expectations (1860–61), these protected, “inalienable commodities” possess the unsettling, often uncanny capacity to travel like any other commercial good, while remaining redolent of a distant place, person, or culture. A particularly powerful piece of culturally portable property might allow one to imaginatively reconstruct an entire absent realm, like the medieval illuminated books from which William Morris felt that all England could be reconstructed, should the world happen to be destroyed.

How do such alternative networks develop? How do certain objects and cultural practices become repositories of such mobile memory? How are we to understand the passionate desire to share recollections, aesthetic experiences, sentiments, and even thoughts that drove lovers to make elaborately braided hair jewelry, parents to decorate photographs of far-off children with hairpieces woven from their actual hair, and letter-writers to enclose palpable tokens attesting to an enduring attachment?

Recent scholarship on the British Empire has stressed—as Seeley does in The Expansion of England (1883)—how vast and lucrative were the settler colonies where a “virgin-land” myth prevailed and where, unlike India, the virtually uncontested expansion of British culture into a razed hinterland was the order of the day. Some scholars have posited that national identity in such settler colonies arose when settlers appropriated the imperial legacy and proclaimed it the basis for a new autochthony. Janet Myers, for example, has described the transplantation of English middle-class ideology to Australia as “portable domesticity.” The notion that national consciousness on imperial peripheries is principally formed by making smoothly portable an extant national consciousness also underlies a memorable argument by Benedict Anderson. Anderson asserts that the moment when settlers in the Massachusetts Bay colony articulated a distinctive sense of Englishness is retrospectively recognizable as the moment when they became Americans (“Exodus” 315). Such accounts conceive of settler nationalism as the product of a series of transformations that refashion an originally imperial English identity. They accordingly risk overlooking interaction with native culture, as well as the complicated interplay between Irish, Scottish, and English Britons that plays such a large role in Australian history.

This theorization of national identity-formation in settler colonies also risks underestimating the role that settlers’ concerted ignorance about native cultures played in their own self-fashioning—an ignorance made possible by their thorough awareness of what “greater Britishness” was capable of replacing. Coupled with an eager focus on the distant metropole, colonists’ insistent neglect of the cultures that surrounded them while abroad is akin to the national nostalgia Angela Woollacott describes as a “desire for London”, which authorized colonial accomplishments only after they were first glorified in the British capital. Ignorance of indigenous cultures was not just a function of this longing for London, however; it derived as well from a desire to defend against those cultures. In every imperial contact zone, the English understood that they were interacting with one or more vibrant subordinate cultures. Overlooking the immediate realities of such contacts was one particularly effective strategy for safeguarding the expansion of England.

Anglo-Indian travel writing shows this defensive posture with special power; it frequently presents English objects as significant bearers of messages from afar so as to defend Anglo-Indianness against a dimly acknowledged autochthonous Indian culture. More importantly, perhaps, portable objects that retained the memory of a distant England also resisted the ominous specter of Indian portability—the threat that Indian commodities might, like the moonstone in Wilkie Collins’s 1868 novel, trail three murderous Indian priests behind them. India, then, was a periphery that threatened to define its own relationship to the metropole, which makes it an ideal place to study metropolitan fear of just such counterflow. Anglo-Indian memsahib texts, which apparently circulated as widely in British settler colonies outside of India as they did back in England, thus serve as templates for Greater British portability.

Thus, the strawberry thief Harriet Tytler and her fellow Englishwomen and men in nineteenth-century India could describe themselves as English without any sense of incongruity, thanks to an immense effort on the part of thousands of Britons throughout the empire to invent, via the objects that carried with them the essence of England, an overseas alternative to native cultural identity. Like the young Saleem in Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1981), whose toy globe reads not “made in England,” but “made as England”, Britons who adopted an Anglo-Indianness that was not made in England but nonetheless had to function “as England” relied on the nostalgia that portable objects kept continually circulating. Always the product of liminal interactions, however, this nostalgia made settlers most colonial precisely at the moment they thought themselves most English.

John Plotz is Associate Professor of English at Brandeis University. The article is drawn from his book Portable Property: Victorian Culture on the Move (Princeton University Press, 2008)

Re-reading Marquez’s Memoir

Manash Bhattacharjee

Many writers and critics have complained about the term “magic realism” used to describe much of Latin American writing by the world publishing market. It was the Cuban novelist Alejo Carpentier who put a more apt phrase for the kind of Latin American fiction that was forcibly translated as magic realist. He called such works of fiction: marvelous real (“lo real marvilloso”).

Europe is infamous for creating binaries after the Enlightenment experience wherein “magical” was opposed to “real” the way “irrational” was opposed to “reason”. So “magic realism” served as an oxymoronic fusion where the two binaries were retained to serve the double tension between the West’s own self-conscious distinction: between a magic deemed to be medieval and realism deemed to be modern within its own history, as well as between “other” cultures which are supposedly still in the grips of “magic” but – and it’s impossible not to be polemical here – in contact with the modern European form of fiction, also attains the claims of realism. In contrast, the term “marvelous real” simply conjures up an image of a fictional world where the word “marvelous” does not suggest something other than the real, but holds the marvelous as an attribute of the ordinary aspects of real life itself. Carpentier distinguished his idea of “lo real marvilloso” by contrasting it with the most vibrant literary movement in Europe during his time, surrealism: “In the first place, the sensation of the marvelous presupposes a faith.  Those who do not believe in saints cannot be cured by the miracles of saints… Thus the idea of the marvelous invoked in the context of disbelief – which is what the surrealists did for so many years – was never anything but a literary trick”.

Surrealism was a violent escape from the traps of Christian values and bourgeois life. It was a fusion of Marx and Rimbaud: a radical aesthetics aiming to liberate society by re-inventing love. In their search for a new future, the surrealists aimed to destroy conventional notions of both (Christian) morality and (bourgeois) reality by embracing the psychic/irrational depths of language. It led them to search and recover the resonances of pre-moral/primordial/pagan origins. Some of the primordial/pagan influences were however marketed into the imagination through a colonial route from non-European cultures.

The surrealist movement can also be read as an attempt to counter the various factors which produced in modern Europe what Weber called “disenchantment”, in the wake of capitalism and the Protestant ethic. Against this rationalization of life and faith, the surrealists introduced an aesthetic of re-enchantment. But, as Carpentier right pointed out, instead of welcoming faith, the surrealists took a critical look at faith, influenced by secular/Marxist traditions. Figures like Salvador Dali were however more ideologically ambiguous than leftist surrealists.

Carpentier’s criticism however, taking the example of Dali’s paintings, is that surrealism’s attempt was “the fabrication of the marvellous”. It is a criticism regarding the codification and manufacturing by Dali and other surrealists of a marvellous reality which wasn’t palpable in modern Europe as opposed to the raw translation by Latin Americans like Marquez of the marvellous which was tangibly experienced in their culture. Though this view holds water, it is important to qualify this crucial distinction. In the case of Latin American fiction, the marvellous was pretty much an easily obtainable material, from which a mise-en-scène could then be created. In surrealism, one could detect the structural influence of the Freudian revolution, with imageries of dream-states and the techniques of deciphering and interpreting them having a huge impact not only on Dali’s paintings, but also on Andre Breton’s concept of “automatic writing”. Carpentier argued how in Latin America, “the marvellous was around every corner”, whereas in Paris “one had to milk reality with great effort in order to extract the marvellous”. Carpentier seems to separate (artistic) labour and magic. He didn’t suspect the possibility that only labour can offer the radical means left in a culture besieged by the power discourses of religious beliefs and bourgeois rationality, to extract, however painfully, remnants of the lost and the buried forces (imageries) of culture. The surrealist enterprise of labour however suffers from a sociologically, if not existentially, alienated productivity.

This alienation can be grasped if one bears in mind that while the post-colonial Latin Americans kept alive their ties with the popular, the surrealists experimented within the artificial confines of an elite environment. The difference also lies in the condition (or situation) which the surrealists faced, where the exceptional had to be produced against the everyday. The surrealists, being revolutionary atheists fighting Christian dogmas, also found it difficult to say what Gabriel Garcia Marquez, despite being a communist, could suggest from a popular register of culture: “If you don’t believe in god, at least be superstitious”. This difference endorses Carpentier’s attempt to see the Latin American literary-scape vis-à-vis Europe through a prism of radical otherness and elsewhere-ness.

Latin American fiction, like any genuine fiction from the non-West, holds up a different version and vision of the world and of life. Even though the modern form of the novel began in Europe, with Cervantes’ Don Quixote, Milan Kundera’s assertion of the novel being “Europe’s creation” is merely an assertion about the creation of a form which has been re-created differently elsewhere. Writers from other cultures, faced with a Europeanizing modernity forced through their colonial histories, have tried to fuse the novel form with its older forms of story telling. The imaginations of fiction in such countries were, in a way, a paradoxical experience of appropriation and resistance. The fact that Marquez could achieve this specific task of fusing the Western form of the novel with his Columbian roots of storytelling is just a case in point. But writers from different cultures have not been necessarily busy in mimicking Europe. They also parodied their own world. As much as Europe was part of their colonized history, in effect, sometimes Europe itself got parodied. Marquez was of course busy in something different altogether: he invented a country (and a culture) through narratives in which both – that particular country and the rest of the world – could together come to read the unique story of its existence.

In the background of this contrast, let us look at Marquez’s memoir, Living to Tell the Tale, as an interesting text which blurs the distinction between fiction and non-fiction, thus moving into the space of marvellous reality through the narrative that affects all literature: the of memory. We will study the memoir and its structuring of memory vis-à-vis texts and forms from Europe which emerged around the same period.

Alastair Reid (in The New York Review of Books, 15/1/2004) gets the point as he calls the memoir, “an exercise in remembering, but without the tensions and contrivances of the novel”. Marquez does not however forget the techniques of story telling as he writes his memoir. The dramatic aspects of fiction is very well infused in the right places to prevent the narrative from appearing like an endless, routine seam of time and events following on each other’s trail. We shall consider a few of them. For now, let us turn to Marquez’s epigraph where he axiomatically draws the correspondence between the structure of life with the structure of memory: “Life is not what one lived, but what one remembers and how one remembers it in order to recount it”.

Perry Anderson (in The Nation, 26/1/2004) views it as “an invitation to selective recall, with all the facilities of a convenient amnesia”. He finds it legitimate to “ask how far memories correspond to facts”. The claim Marquez is making about life should unerringly be linked to the aspiration of writing a memoir.  The narrative of one’s life written through a process of remembering across lived time doesn’t need to corroborate mere facts through an objective digging into the past, as memory is vastly imbued with subjective ghosts where the person paints his life over the canvas of lost time, with every event being illumed by how one has been affected then and now rather than by projecting any truth-version. It’s true that Marquez seems to have kept quiet on many incidents and people. This does not necessarily warrant a judgment over selectivity. Even the act of remembering makes choices over which sleeping dogs to be left lying and which specters to bring up. In such a situation, recalling of the past is unavoidably selective but never on self-conscious grounds, and one can call the amnesia “convenient” only out of one’s own objective prejudices. We anyway don’t choose our own amnesia – amnesia, so to say, chooses us.

The act of remembering is never an act of recalling the truth about one’s life but rather a glimpse into the very real fiction of life. The essential difference between literature and philosophy arises from this distinction. For philosophy, “truth” is always the pivotal concept behind the search for meanings ranging from the idea of the state, to the idea of being, to life itself. This attitude turns a narrative moral, and hence justificatory in character, from the point of view of a truth-claim or a claim veering around (or against) truth.

The English proverb tells us that truth is stranger than fiction. What is revealing here is how the word truth is deployed in a way as to depend on the aura of strangeness when compared with and against fiction. The terms can be reversed and said that in literature, truth itself acquires a strange place, dipped in the schisms between words and reality. Literature, in this sense, aims for a more subjective story of human life where the question of truth is exposed to a game.

Marquez’s memoir is the triumph of narrative innovation where the story of his life borders on the fictional, even as it obliquely illuminates the novels he’s written. It reads like a story about his stories, about how he collected his materials from the characters he knew and weaved them into tales. His memoir is a tale that travels through the sideways of his fiction. The structure of Marquez’s memoir is episodic rather than linear. It inevitability is caused by how memory itself structures time. This shilly-shally between past and present life, provoked by memory, marks the flow of narrative-time.

In Living to Tell, Marquez has shown that a storyteller’s attitude and a memoir’s raison d’ etre can make an imaginative pact. A memoir, unlike an autobiography, is a story of encounters without reflective motifs. The encounters are part of pure story, narrated without any philosophical consequence for the writer. Autobiographies are anchored in the self’s predilections. With structural innovation and dramatic techniques, Marquez has managed to radically move the genre of the memoir towards fiction. The memoir gives Marquez ample space to experiment this alliance of genres as he’s clearly not interested in philosophical problems but in telling a story.

The autobiography is traced back to Augustine’s Confessions. Commentators see it as a narrative form where the immanent temporal form of the autobiography is displaced by the ideal and static scheme of allegory. But it is agreed that even when the autobiography took its modern, secularized form, the idea of the “self” always seemed to draw out, under autonomous garbs, certain religious and normative ideas, thus never really abandoning the allegorical influence. The confessional scheme was Christian not only for Augustine but also, years later, for Rousseau. The main concern here is how the autobiography was always an anxious enterprise to describe a journey of the self to be recovered, examined, vindicated, defended or simply guided in time through certain idealized visions. In autobiographies, the drawing of a relationship with one’s self is the central anxiety, ambition and trope.

But a memoir has a different task to deliver. It is about the story, which the self undergoes with others. What the writer pursues in the memoir is not the evolution of the self but the evolution of a life of stories, a story of lives. Marquez’s memoir is further, a tribute to all his loved ones, the way he had once, more playfully commented in his interview with Plinio Apulevo Mendoza, on One Hundred Years of Solitude being “a bit of a joke, full of signals to close friends”. Marquez’s sensibility re-claims that no genuine literary work can take place outside its immediate human sphere; with any pretensions to universality.

European memoirs/autobiographies however couldn’t get away from the Kantian influence. In Sartre’s Words, where he reminiscences his childhood and adolescence, the writing is both lyrical and philosophical. Though sometimes descriptions of people and events do take on a purely literary flavour, the stirrings of a philosophical detachment from the world are writ large in the progress of Sartre’s life. Even as Sartre does offer memorable pictures of the world he was born in (primarily his mother and his grand parents), the “I” of the narrative gains a philosophical stronghold. There is a visible crack in Words, between Sartre’s verbal flourish in describing things, people and his relationship with them, and a Protestant-like analysis of self-growth where he confronts religion, his family, his class and the social morality surrounding him. He sounds having saved himself against his angst by climbing the ladder of reason. He mixes literary aphorisms (“I was born from writing; before that, there was only a reflection in a mirror”) with philosophical insinuations (“The conscious mind can only act later as critic, selector, discarder”). The Kantian anxiety is obvious.

For Marquez, the beginning of memory is however not adulterated by any sense of real, historical alienation. For many European writers, the 20th century came to be the age of exiles. For writers who fled their home country, memory became the cause of anguish. Vladimir Nabokov in his memoir Speak, Memory, draws the most celebrated literary trysts between memory and language. But in contrast to Marquez’s memoir, where the recovery of the past becomes the marvelously real journey for the self, Nabokov’s is a piece de resistance about the displaced and dusty-eyed relationship between the self and its severed past. The exiled literature of Europe sought its self to be recovered, while other worlds like Marquez’s Columbia, threw up stories of a culture to be re-covered. Nabokov, who was forced to flee Russia with his family when he was eighteen, brings in the quiet lyricism of loss to his prose of remembering, while Marquez is content to conjure up the excessive craze-language of his culture. An alienated life turns Nabokov back to the burnt up pebble-shores of his self. For Marquez, the self is merged with inventive abandon into the mythopoetical fold of his cultural life. Nabokov has to force his memory to “speak” with a haunted nostalgia, while memory puts Marquez on a flight-vision of language. Nabokov seizes his clarity in Speak, Memory with this admission: “The break in my own destiny affords me in retrospect a syncopal kick that I would not have missed for worlds”. This kick however slows Nabokov down, as his mind tries to pick up the scents and voices of lost things. It adds a pensive poise to his narrative. Nabokov remembers from afar whereas Marquez discovers within range – lost landscapes of a bygone life. Yet, the subjective worlds of writers can sometimes speak in the same tongue. Like this evocation of temporality that Nabokov brings in Speak, Memory could well have been Marquez’s own: “I confess I do not believe in time. I like to fold my magic carpet, after use, in such a way as to superimpose one part of the pattern upon another. Let visitors trip”.

We shall now look at three moments in the memoir to highlight three important registers of Marquez’s life. In the beginning of the memoir, Marquez mentions how his mother comes looking for him, despite the knowledge that he is drinking with his writer friends. Before he could react upon seeing her, she said: “I am your mother”.

The dramatic resonance of this statement, deployed by Marquez to arouse our attention, is a unique style of transporting the ordinary to the level of the exemplary. The mother’s declaration is authoritative as much as vulnerable. Marquez reminisces immediately about how many pregnancies she had gone through and yet how she managed to look beautiful at her age. It is a registering of pain, dignity and beauty all at once. Just as her statement evokes a bond which is at once bio-logical and socio-logical. In his registering of the mother, Marquez doesn’t forget the woman.

Marquez also speaks in this memoir about his friends and how they differed in their political positions. One was an “orthodox liberal”, another “a reluctant freethinker”, yet another “an arbitrary anarchist”. Marquez himself was seen as “an unbelieving Communist and potential suicide”. Marquez sums up the basis of their affinity: “I believe without any doubt at all that our greatest good fortune was that even in the most extreme difficulties we might lose our patience but never our sense of humor”. It is impossible not to relate to the wisdom behind that experience. Humour does not resolve differences but often helps to dissolve them. It reduces the seriousness of the world into a playground of insignificance – through it we bear the world, register our complaints and mend the strains of solidarity.

Reviewers of this book have taken notice of the incident where Marquez unselfconsciously wrote how he wanted to finish lunch in the midst of blood-splattering eruptions in Bogotá, following the murder of the popular leader Gaitan.  Even when his brother urged him to join a student’s protest against the murder, Marquez decidedly wished to flee. I would like to defend this quail-ish attitude in the writer against his critics.

Marquez said he stopped learning since the age of eight, after he left his grandmother’s house. The intimacy with maids and other women in the house convinced Marquez that women “are the ones who maintain the whole world” while men “throw it into disarray with our historic brutality”. Influenced by a matriarchal culture, Marquez has a unique eye for the masculine aspects of politics. From this decisive angle, he traverses through the frontiers of politics with watchdog alertness but with an equal irony. As he said in his interview with Mendoza: “I see myself as having been forced by circumstances into political activity”. His attitude to politics always retained this ambivalence of engagement and distance. He holds an inimical position that resists an ideological/moral typology, where taking part in a violent political event is held as a political form of duty for a writer. This relationship with politics is also born from and is a consequence of a writer’s unavoidable sense of solitude. Solitude is also the harbour of memory, and of all writing. 

Manash Bhattacharjee is  a poet and a political theorist. This piece was first published in – Biblio, July-August, 2010 – issue.

A Moment of Revelation

 Prasanta Chakravarty

(A Report on ‘The Everyday Life of a Discipline’- a colloquium on contemporary English Studies that took place on February 4, 2011, at the Department of English, University of Delhi)

Unlike the social sciences, humanities in India at least, have been less systematic and meticulous about introspection. This is slightly odd owing to the fact that the onslaughts on humanitities, from both outside and from within its own quarters, have been quite relentless and ballistic of late. Besides, it is a good idea to take stock of things from time to time as disciplines morph and change gear. So, when I was asked to be part of a group of practitioners of humanities who were at the forefront of the last bit of stock-taking that took place during the late nineteen-eighties, I was curious to know how they see their own transition at this point of time and also get a sense about their assessment of English studies now, apart from my own contribution to the current debates. 

Alok Rai, Rajeswari Sunder Rajan and Gauri Viswanathan are literary critics and scholars who in their own ways, along with many other fellow scholars, actually helped make a strong case for various changes in the way disciplines and departments of literature function. Chief among them were vital questions on the politics of canon-formation, the role of language in literature, issues of vernacular articulations and translation, forms of colonialism—including homebred ones, identifying markers of gender and identity politics and so on. In 2011, many of these issues are quite relevant and yet doing literature today also means dealing with fresh challenges and innovations.

For one, we now inhabit a much more fractured global world with more surreptitious forms of literary activities and attacks on it. The deeply invested local author is as much rooted in his own milieu as in other networks that mediate continuously with his own output and imagination. A dynamic scholarly document no longer resemble a linear narrative. There is a challenging task to identify and tackle this whole new field called digital humanities where literature intersects with documentation, visual media and other interactive literary production. There are issues of power equations involved with such innovations and yet these areas and paratactic associations could be explored effectively and critically.

There is now a tremendous investment in areas like textual and print studies, new aesthetic formalisms, detecting renewed ideals of empire formation in texts, studying subjective spaces (from diaries to autobiographies to blogs), invoking sacred spaces or looking for legal implications in literature and reconfiguring the political in literary utterances—say, looking closely at the way political poetry (a genre often not recognized adequately by postcolonial criticism) has been able to galvanize people in Middle East or parts of South America, of late. These concerns are not necessarily new to literary studies, but the times demand a fresh historicization from the practitioners.

So, it was interesting when Alok Rai started the proceedings with a mea culpa: that he feels like Hardy’s Jude—a hapless prisoner, in this case, implicated in the trajectory of literary criticism the way it has played out. What combination of sweetness and light led him to think that the outside is free and vigorous and the academe is not so—he asked himself. Even as he acknowledged the valuable works of the literary critics (on forgotten scandals and caste autobiographies) in the past three decades or so in cahoots with, what he marked as the cruising gangs of philosophers and social scientists, he came down heavily on the fake benignity (ah! English is so oppressed by Shelley) of such high moral endeavours. To study literature has become surrogating on a certain idea of reality, to gain a purchase on how one can affect the proceedings around oneself, even if that is through exploring tributaries of power or micro-studies of texts and textualities. Scholarship has become a matter of conviction rather than appreciation: ethically bankrupt, overtly politicized and thoroughly without joy. The world itself has become a text and the idea of representation is eroded. No appreciation for the subtleties of speech or rhetoric there. This Rai feels to be a kind of textual-political imperialism.

The price to pay then is a gradual erosion of appreciating a certain cognitive purchase that the ‘word’ provides. This expanding world of textual imperialism on the word, that forces us to forget the joys of discovering the turn of the phrase or the craft of lucid composition, is now being gutted down by the grim managerial class. The accounting protocols of footloose capitalism, which is not even deliberately cruel, is completely oblivious to the loss of this shared world. He invoked the multifarious life-world of Milan Kundera and John Keats’ idea of negative capability—the ability to dwell in uncertainties, mysteries and half-knowledge that literature provides us—in order to appreciate the role of literature in a world away from the capitalists and their vulgar opponents. 

Rai is essentially asking for two things: by means of getting back into the specificity of the word, he seeks to reconnect literature with a communitas of connoisseurs. There is a certain repossessing of an enshrined certainty of the experiential or the aesthetic in this act. But since he is at the same time arguing against the righteous certainty of literary activism, he also celebrates the complexity of the life-world that revels in its uncertainty of the fantasy, away from verisimilitude or truth hunting. There is a lament for the world that we have lost and a clarion call to restore a certain complexity within that very world, by capturing the nuances of literary hermeneutics. Rai’s project is philological, a historicization of the text after theory!

Rajeswari Sunder Rajan does not see humanities to be in a mode of crisis at this point. The crisis she finds in rather two concomitant developments: in the ideas that claim a of clash of civilizations even in the literary world and a rampant provincialism in literary-critical activities on the other hand. As an antidote to both—she offers a particular kind of secular-multicultural critique—one that will be sensitive to different cultures and values. She is aware that such renewed attempts to translate cultures and ‘collect’ literary data (say, a fresh lease of life that Arabic is having after 9/11, which is likely to increase manifold after developments in Tunisia and Egypt) has an underside—anthropological tools to be used as soft targets and future propaganda.

Nevertheless, Sunder Rajan bestows a certain salvational role to literature. Literature, as it were, is a secular correlative to religion. One must look for a space of literature and literary pursuits outside of the university precincts in order to reclaim its position. This is also important since, Sunder Rajan announced—much of the oppositional impulses of the left or feminism is now spent, thanks to changes in geopolitical arrangements. As a good example of a contemporary contrarian she referred to Simon During and his book Exit Capitalism: Culture, Theory and Post-Secular Modernity—and During’s ideas of using imagination as a bulwark to the forces of crass capitalism. Literature is a stabilizing force, rather than disruptive and utopian in such an imagination. In fact, Sunder Rajan was quite upfront about literature’s elite and selective preoccupations and affirmed the new spirit to conserve these preoccupations, which, she felt, store the most social power against democratic state capitalism.

If we look carefully at Simon During’s book or his recent utterances (in the SSRC blog—The Immanent Frame), we would notice that During, not unlike Sunder Rajan, feels that literature allows us a dizzying moment in which the frontiers between the real and imaginary, the ordinary and the exceptional, are broken in a way that cannot be accommodated by a non-secular lexicon. It’s not sublime, or an epiphany, or a visitation of grace that literature provides. But it carries its own ecstatic and unworldly charge. Literature is a world unto itself, observant but detached—a classic liberal humanist position to take. Sunder Rajan is once again moving towards an affirmation of the autonomy of the written word, but unlike Rai, is calling for a return to comparative philology in new forms—say, via world literature or global studies.

Gauri Viswanathan was not very enamoured by the idea of the salvific and individual national literatures. She kept on arguing for de-nationalizing literature in a different fashion. As a classic example of such a mode of writing, she cited the South African scholar Isabel Hofmeyr’s book The Portable Bunyan: A Transnational History of the Pilgrim’s Progress, published in 2003.

What happens to a literary artefact as it is translated into different languages, contexts, and societies? How is it changed by the intellectual environments it encounters? What does the transnational circulation mean for its reception back home? Hofmeyr follows John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress as it circulates through multiple contexts–and into some 200 languages–focusing on Africa, where 80 of the translations occurred. In the process, the book crucially accounts for how The Pilgrim’s Progress travelled abroad with the Protestant mission movement, was adapted and reworked by the societies into which it travelled, and, finally, how its circulation throughout the empire affected Bunyan’s standing back in England. It weaves together British, African, and Caribbean history with literary and translation studies and debates over African Christianity and mission.

Here we have another example of “world literature” which denies nationhood but gives critical importance over translation, both linguistic and cultural. Viswanathan has a particular transcendental idea of freeing literary studies from the moorings of the nation state (and not filling with a literary content as Rai and Sunder Rajan would have it) and yet refilling it with a notion of portability and travel. But in this notion of portability and circulation, there is not much space for the local, which she too felt was another name for the narrowly provincial. There is also little critical questioning of the notion of the transnational. The work of art or literature is a matter of multiple productions and circulation, rather than any unified hermeneutic entity, as Viswanthan would have it.

What strikes me is the particular halo that literature is being given here with very little investment in the everyday. The lived and material moorings of the text, the writer, the receptor and the critic are gone and gone. What we have instead, are some worrying inferences: that blueprints of refusing capitalism are to be salvaged by reclaiming an ethical community or a hermeneutic practice that will at best be moments of deferral or ways of stonewalling the onslaught, and at worst, a pacifism of the shady grove of the word that would cocoon itself off completely from the attacks on literature per se and in the process, provide a field day to the marauding band of libertarians and their sell-out cronies.

The idea of multiculturalism, imagined in terms of a secular-philological enterprise, is another idea of literature that not only keeps itself secure from the blood and grime of literary transactions but the very cultural specificity and close-reading that it champions, becomes anthropological rather than getting grounded in the literary cultures of a place or movement or specific confrontations. It is no wonder that the names of Amitav Ghosh or Orhan Pamuk comes up as frequent examples in this kind of an old-school comparative philological enterprise. Once you begin by being suspicious of the vernacular for being provincial (which well could be at times), you have finite and cautious possibities, some of which we notice here. You also begin to undermine alternative networks and genres of literary pursuits.

The idea of circulation of texts, on the other hand, though a promising one, can hardly stand on its own as a form of critical scholarship. Portability itself is no justification for literature: the reading of the text against its grain is a vital aspect of literary scholarship, not merely noting the various movements across time and space. And then the issues of production and labour are vital in critiquing ideas of consumptive and circulating texts. The whole idea is to note and overturn the transnational conformities and banal consumerism that we see in airport lounges and literary festivals—so that one can carefully distinguish such half-hearted median fad from both the classical and the popular.

This is by no means a representative group of scholars who are thinking about humanities at this moment, but it is still instructive to watch out the way they are think and direct, because their pronouncements matter. What newness do such speculations bring in their wake? What fresh questions can we ask in the classroom and how do we innovate while sketching research methodologies? Most importantly: what are we asking the fresh minds to ponder on, even as they wish to critically delve into the stories and poems that are part of their very existence?

Prasanta Chakravarty is Associate Professor, Department of English, University of Delhi.

Homeric-Thersitic

 

Robert H. Bell

 “But after all, what is the whole subject matter of that revered poem the Iliad but ‘the broils of foolish kings and the foolish populace’?”—Desiderius Erasmus (The Praise of Folly)

Human folly at Troy is rampant, starting with the Greek king and commander Agamemnon, who recklessly insults Achilles, refuses to apologize, and suddenly, inexplicably, decides to test the resolve of his army. Declaring the end of the siege, the king is flummoxed when his troops flock eagerly to their ships. The Greek cause ap­pears lost. Suddenly steps forth a remarkable, puzzling figure: “Thersites of the endless speech,” who “knew within his head many words, but disorderly;/vain, and without decency, to quarrel with the princes/with any word he thought might be amusing to the Argives.”

Who is Thersites? Not even Homer seems to know. The single orator in the Iliad unidentified by rank, patronymic, or place of origin, his name suggests “loud-mouth” and “courage,” in the sense of boldness, impudence. Reputedly the ugliest man at Troy, he surpasses his glowing, glowering peers for sheer repul­siveness. Since only one other Iliadic character is individuated by appearance and few ever described physically, the elaborate delineation of an apparently minor, fleeting figure is striking. The bard oddly highlights and seemingly undermines Thersites. De­formed and despised, Thersites seems utterly grotesque.

Despite conspicuous disqualifications, reviled Thersites seizes the stage and delivers a sixteen-line speech to the entire assembly. Astonishingly, this scorned freak publicly upbraids Agamemnon for greed and lust: you’ve already claimed valuable bronze and the choicest women, “whom we Achaians/give to you first of all whenever we capture some stronghold/Or is it still more gold you will be wanting, that some son/of the Trojans, breakers of horses, brings as ransom out of Ilion.” All this ransom and booty are the spoils “that I, or some other Achaian, capture and bring in? / Is it some young woman to lie with in love and keep her/all to yourself apart from the others? It is not right for/you, their leader, to lead in sorrow the sons of the Achaians.”

After excoriating Agamemnon, and flaunting the principles of rhetoric, Thersites assails his audience (“Achaian girls . . . women, not men”), repudiates their mission, and urges abandonment. Although Thersites’ rabble-rousing is unavailing, it provokes an immediate, decisive reaction from Odysseus, who abuses and scourges Thersites. Everyone laughs over him happily. Entertained and amused, the soldiers forget their incipient mutiny and return to ranks. So much, it seems, for Thersites, basest wretch at Troy. Humiliated, a pathetic, obnoxious creature, he disappears into oblivion. As is right and proper, according to Odysseus, and to most right-thinking people. Reading Homer in the nineteenth century, Prime Minister Gladstone found the speech “not a good one.”

Because Thersites is so flamboyantly over the top, he is not always credited for being on the mark. Critics tend to agree with the soldiers and Odysseus. They have marked Thersites’ ten­dentious description, his physical ugliness and moral turpitude. Is Thersites a monstrosity by heroic standards? Martin argues that the speech of Thersites, “quite literally, ‘without meter,’” is “over-determined to look bad by a number of criteria,” including slurring his words. Evidently “just an entertainer,” he “deserves no respect.”

Much like the Hephaestos sequence, another intervention by a disabled figure prompting mocking laughter, this episode is disconcerting, and fruitfully so. But ought we to dismiss Thersites so precipitately? Notwithstanding the soldiers’ contempt, the nar­rator’s malice, and the PM’s condescension, Thersites’ “words of revilement” are words of power provoking instant reaction from Odysseus. Thersites is no blithering madman or prating malcon­tent, and Agamemnon’s reckless conduct he himself eventually acknowledges as folly or madness, até. Impertinent yet pertinent, speaking truth to power, Thersites is seriously threatening. He says that Agamemnon “dishonoured Achilles, a man much better/than he is.” Thersites sarcastically echoes and ironically lauds Achilles: “there is no gall in Achilles’ heart, and he is forgiving.” Ha! “Oth­erwise,” he says to Agamemnon, “this were your last outrage.” Thersites locates (one might say) the Achilles heel of the antagonistic chiefs. Shrewdly, he recognizes the gravity of the king’s transgression, and intuits how close Agamemnon was to be­ing killed by the infuriated Achilles.

Laughed at, willing to “say any word he thought might be amusing,” Thersites is an unusual yet recognizable comic figure. Aristotle conceives comic types as “worse” than men are, mean­ing less admirable in appearance, character, and conduct. While “high mimetic” characters like Achilles live for an ideal (glory, say, or arête), “low mimetic” figures like Thersites are more fully embodied. Thersites’ physical freakishness exposes the sexual and appetitive motives of Agamemnon and Achilles, and for his pains is pummeled and harried. Aristotle’s brief remarks On Rhetoric, identifying three types of comic characters, bear upon Thersites. He is a buffoon, jesting to amuse others; he is an eiron, feigning ideals to mock Agamemnon; he is also an alazon or imposter, strutting and blustering to aggrandize himself.

It’s possible to regard Thersites as comic relief or as a foil to set off the solemnity of the heroes and their epic mission. In this view, Thersites is a lightning rod, like those Shakespearean commenta­tors who exist, observes William Empson pungently, “not at all to parody the heroes but to stop you from doing so: ‘If you want to laugh at this sort of thing laugh now and get it over.” Arguably, Thersites absorbs the destructive capability of purely derisive cynicism. To sustain a potent, viable heroic spirit, one might conclude, Homer inoculates his characters to resist more devastating, potentially fatal, strains of irony.

Though tempting, this model fails to account for the extent of Thersites’ disruptive force. Like Shakespeare who develops Thersites into a major character in Troilus and Cressida, Homer con­jures not a stock buffoon but a truth-teller, a wise fool. Certainly Thersites is foolish and reckless: “disorderly;/vain, and without decency,” he thwarts order, propriety, and decorum. Thersites presumes the fool’s remarkable license to speak harsh truths. However abusive and merciless, his invective is inventive and amusing. Thersites is a self-conscious performer, mocking the heroic enterprise and eviscerating his superiors. For which of course he pays the price. The fool is a scapegoat or pariah; ques­tioning the legitimacy of authority, he risks banishment (or worse) for what is always called impiety or treason. Odysseus castigates Thersites for “playing the fool,” threatens to cast him out “bare and howling,” and scourges the fool with Agamem­non’s royal scepter; thus the divine symbol of authority is literally the tool of enforcement.

If we are inclined to preserve authority or decorum, we can enjoy the spectacle and stress the anomaly of Thersites, so weirdly different from our heroes! Yet Thersites, “worst of Greeks,” echoes and recapitulates Achilles, pride of the Greeks; Thersites satirizes what Achilles epitomizes. The parallels are inescapable: at pre­cisely the same moment in Books 1 and 2, a character bursts out to attack the authorities. Vituperative, insulting, intemperate, they are reckless figures, kamikaze pilots, outraged and outrageous. Both assault Agamemnon and deprecate the soldiers. Each is isolated for his transgressions, Achilles in splendor, Thersites in ignominy. Thersites is a disgraceful, ridiculous caricature of the hero’s tragic grandeur, greater stature and complexity. To regard Thersites as a conventional foil makes sense but begs the question: why does Homer make Thersites so eerily like Achilles in several minute particulars?

A more subversive possibility is that Thersites is Achilles’ second self. In satirizing and parodying the hero, Thersites dem­onstrates intimate familiarity and implicit affinity with Achilles. Agamemnon tells Achilles that he speaks “abusively,” that “forever quarrelling is dear to your heart,” while Thersites is known for the “shrill noise of his abuse,” and his propensity to “quarrel with princes.” Achilles “dashed to the ground the sceptre,” that emblem of authority used by Odysseus to thrash Thersites. Even more telling is the similarity of their articu­lation. Both say that Agamemnon hogs the booty and demands the prettiest concubines. Both claim to fight nobly, to deliver captives. Each urges the troops to return home, and both remark that it will teach Agamemnon a sorely-need lesson. Both Thersites and Achilles “quarrel with the princes”—in Greek (though not in Lattimore’s translation) the same phrase is used for both. Thersites repeats Achilles verbatim at certain points.

Such multiple correspondences between Thersites and Achil­les are far more elaborate than necessary to contrast epic hero and satiric slanderer. Alarmingly, the basest wretch too exactly parallels the exalted hero, as if Thersites intuits Achilles’ feelings and speaks on his behalf, closely echoing several sentiments. Not even the exigencies of oral poetry explain why or how Thersites concludes his speech, “Otherwise, son of Atreus, this were your last outrage”—a daring, rash threat reiterating Achilles word for word. That last utterance is quite uncanny, since Thersites was not present to hear Achilles.

While Thersites parodies or satirizes Achilles, once can see that he functions as a double or doppelganger, a version of Achilles seen through a glass darkly. With such evocative affinities hero and outcast are a little more than kin. We’ve seen that Thersites’ abuse is hyperbolic, over-the-top, yet apposite, spot on. Both in what he says (he “knew within his head many words,”) and what he is, Thersites doubles meanings. Thersites’ parody humorously degrades the sublime. Homer’s he­roic and mock-heroic elements are imbricated. Thersites is a dark shadow of Achilles, sacrificed instead of the untouchable hero: Perhaps Achilles is a tragic, as Thersites is a comic, scapegoat.

Disabled like Hephaestos, Thersites is enabled too. Thersites is an avatar of comic energy that disrupts events, complicates issues, eludes closure, and generates inquiry. One particularly slippery Homeric crux suggests a calculated ambiguity of identity. The Greeks, we are told, “were furiously angry with him, their minds resentful. (Latimore translation).” Or, “furious with him, deeply offended”(Fagles translation). Angry or furious with whom? Alexander Pope makes clear that the Greeks were “Vext” at/with Thersites. But in Greek, the pronoun reference is ambiguous; the soldiers could be angry with either Thersites or Agamemnon. Leaf’s massive commentary says “clearly Agamemnon,” that Thersites is “at the moment the accepted spokesman of the mob, who are indignant with Agamemnon.” Surely that meaning is available. “Homer is here conveying the idea of general Achaian support for Achil­leus’ stance,” articulated by Thersites and supported by ordinary soldiers, says Norman Postlethwaite. If so, the fickle mob experi­ences fluctuating sympathies, more various and complex attitudes than simple derision.

Typically fools are marginal characters, heedless of social im­peratives, challenging hierarchy, flouting norms, turning things topsy-turvy. A mocker and a jester, Thersites is Homer’s wise fool and crucial chorus. Repulsive and pathetic, outrageous and ridicu­lous, his trenchant critique is potent. This isn’t merely detrimental to morale; it is seditious and subversive. That Thersites strikes a nerve, and threatens the whole enterprise, is evident in Odysseus’ heavy-handed over-kill. It’s not just that Odysseus lacks humor or cannot suffer fools gladly. Thersites raises substantive issues that are tellingly ignored by Odysseus and essentially unanswerable. Without really responding to Thersites’ argument, Odysseus orates, not very persuasively. After Thersites’ sinewy and insinuating lan­guage, Odysseus sounds bombastic and flaccid. In Homer’s Greek, he crudely threatens to expose Thersites’ genitals.

In the inauspicious person of Thersites, Homer endows the disloyal opposition. Many-minded Homer is—I have argued—far more receptive to humor and sympathetic to Thersites than his crit­ics, as Pope recognized: “there is nothing in this Speech but what might have become the mouth of Nestor himself, if you except a word or two. And had Nestor spoken it, the Army had certainly set sail for Greece; but because it was utter’d by a ridiculous Fel­low whom they are ashamed to follow, they are not reduc’d, and satisfy’d to continue the Seige.” Pope’s translation conveys the blazing force of Thersites—the fearless, foolish satirist whose “wit­ty malice” Pope cherishes and emulates in his “own” satires.

 Thersites only clamour’d in the throng,

Loquacious, loud, and turbulent of Tongue:

Aw’d by no shame, by no respect controul’d,

In scandal busy, in reproaches bold;

With witty malice studious to defame,

Scorn all his joy, and laughter all his aim.

But chief he glory’d with licentious style

To lash the great, and monarchs to revile.

At first he seems to endorse the heroic code; gradually Thersites reveals the iron fist beneath the velvet glove. “Whate’er our master craves, submit we must,/Plagu’d with his pride, or punished for his lust.” The damning truth condemns Agamemnon, locked into that couplet rhyming “submit we must” and “punished for his lust.”

Thersites is bright and brassy, insufferable and indispensable. He defies constraints and turns things topsy-turvy. Adroit at im­personation, an acute parodist, he marches to his own rhythms. There is a nice comic reversal with a satiric twist: introduced as one who loves to provoke laughter, Thersites leaves to jeering laugh­ter. But this humor ricochets and boomerangs: if the mocker is mocked, so is the audience. Thersitic energies are both centrifugal and centripetal. No wonder Thersites provokes such intense and disparate reactions from commentators: he has multiple purposes and contradictory consequences. Values clash like contending war­riors. Homer’s technique is dialogic and dialectical. Thersites and Odysseus debate fundamental principles of heroic conduct.

Homer suggests that the sublime and the ridiculous are much closer than single-minded Odysseus can afford to believe. The Thersites se­quence is a midnight foray from the heroic fields of glory to the shifting terrain of startling satiric humour, not a comfortable place to stand but a vantage point Homer insists we visit.

Robert H. Bell is Frederick Latimer Wells Professor of English, Williams College, Massachusetts.

Narrativisationalities of Ribaldian Discourse

Dilip Simeon

This is my Rifle and that is my Gun,
This is for shooting and that is for fun.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text,
Discourse for this life, and Text for the next.

Ethnicity, Felicity, Moment of Poesis,
Deploying Derrida, contrive halitosis.
Deconstruct Narratives, re-inventing the Nation,
Imagining India, maximise obfuscation.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text..etc

Field Marshal editor, Subaltern mate,
Retrieving the Body, what fun to relate.
Self from the Occident, Other from East,
Apply your Mind to know Beauty from Beast.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun..etc

This is my Thesis and that my curricula,
Voyaging westwards, remain perpendicular.
Narrativize textuality of sexuality,
Canonize Prurience of Orientality.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text..etc

Archaeological Silences, scatalogical noise,
Knowledge is Power, wear it with poise.
Positing Subject, we wish to sublate,
Delivering seminar, we sit and rotate.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun…etc

Eros, Telos, Nemesis, Mimesis,
Mug up my jargon for passing your thesis.
Alas ! Alack ! the subversifying Mind,
Earning hard currency, so hard to find.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc

Mentalitie and Problematique,
Academic fashions need a boutique
Matriarch, Patriarch, theme for research,
Mantra and Tantra from ivory perch.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun..etc

Subliminalities of subtextualities,
Ponder pomposities of prolix verbosities.
Problematising the hidden thematic,
Metatextualising intellectuals Asiatic.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc

Locating, Migrating, mastering Said,
Oriental professor wants to get —–.
Multicultural interpenetration,
Metropolitan colonial wants integration.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun…etc

Ethnographics of phantasmagoria,
Induce seances of mental euphoria.
While translating the palimpsest tender,
Oh how I long for the opposite gender.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc

Overinterpreting marxist constipation,
Wallow in post-modern self flagellation.
Transposing observer to popular stance,
Overdetermining professorial romance.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun..etc

Agenda of subtext needs corrigendum,
Traversing terrain of ethnic pudendum.
Verbs become nouns, with lightening velocity,
Opaqueness of meaning, euphonic ferocity.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc

Excavating silences, admiring the skirt,
Unearthing allegories of lexico-inert.
Pluralisms of syncretistic exterior,
Massaging advisors’ psychic interior.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun…etc

Dissecting semiotics of peasant Tebhaga,
Fieldworking students need munim dhaga.
But how to explain to examiners’ team,
The subtler uses of dhaga munim.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc

Teasing long hidden truths if I may,
Bribing chaprasis how can I say.
Slog long enough, material will out,
By which time victory will turn into rout.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun…etc

Elementary aspects of peasant insurgency
Turmoil underneath causing slight divergency.
Inverting reality only goes to show,
Faculty wanting History from below.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc.

Dilip Simeon is a labour historian, political activist and chairperson of the Aman Trust.  He is the author of  Revolution Highway (Penguin India, 2010).


A Life Less Ordinary

Yajnaseni Chakraborty

Her tiny, birdlike frame seems lost in the embrace of a large, plush sofa in an anteroom of the business centre at the Oberoi Grand. But Nadine Gordimer still spells personality with a capital P. At 84, she is a beautiful woman, her delicate face framed by silver grey hair, her eyes a clear blue-black. I have been warned that she may terminate the interview if she doesn’t like the questions (she hates interviews anyway), so of course my list of questions seems totally inadequate.

Besides, she has fixed me with a firm stare and announced that she refuses interviews that aren’t recorded. “I want you to write what I have said,” she tells me softly but clearly, with just a trace of her South African lilt. “Not what you think I’ve said, and I talk quickly, too.” I assure her I will faithfully write down every word, and she looks doubtful for a moment before compressing her lips and signaling me to get on with it. So I nervously do. Because Nadine Gordimer the anti-apartheid activist is so much part of Nadine Gordimer the writer, I start off asking her about the battles she has fought, and continues to fight. “I played a small role. I didn’t go to jail, as many of my comrades did. I went as far as my courage would allow,” she says. “You see, I am first of all a writer, I was born that way, but I am also a human being.” In a lecture delivered in Kolkata the previous evening, Gordimer has alluded to the moral and social responsibility of the writer, and when the question comes up again, now, she carefully dissociates such responsibility from “propaganda”.

She categorises her writings alongside those of Athol Fugard and Andre Brink and Es’kia Mphahlele (which she pronounces ‘Empashlele’, and when I imitate her correctly, I earn the verbal equivalent of a pat on the back). “We were living at a time when we had to write the truth, the bits that were never reported in the newspapers. But then, governments never listen to writers.” Evidently they do, considering the bans imposed on three of her novels by the apartheid government. “I’m glad they were banned. No bans would have been worrying,” she says wryly.

By now, Gordimer has unbent enough to discuss any possible crisis of faith that she may have faced, and I feel I am allowed to ask who she turned to during those crises. She agrees she is an atheist with left-wing sympathies, explains that the source of her faith is “our responsibility to each other”, and then wistfully turns to her favourite poet W.B. Yeats: “What do we know but that we face/ One another in this lonely place?”

The question of ‘responsibility’ is evidently a significant one in her life. It is the single most important reason why she never really considered leaving South Africa. Her late husband, Reinhardt Cassirer, belonged to a notable family of Berlin Jews. He arrived in South Africa as a refugee from Nazi Germany, and studied in London and Heidelberg. “He wasn’t Africa born and bred like me, and he had a nostalgic love for London, I suppose, so we did toy with the idea of living there for a while, but in the end I realized I was too attached to Africa,” she smiles.

 As a white South African who established deeply personal bonds with the anti-apartheid movement, Gordimer nevertheless remains reserved and unsentimental about the risks she must have run as a supporter of the once outlawed African National Congress. But her face lights up in a rare smile when she recalls the experience of standing in a mixed-race queue to vote in her country’s first post-apartheid election. “It was the best experience of my life,” she says. Better than the Nobel Prize? “Yes it was, really.”

 Mixed race brings us to the question of Indians in South Africa, who, Gordimer notes approvingly, did not flee the country as those in Kenya did. “They stayed and went to prison,” she smiles again. And Kenya, the home of Vidiadhar Surajprasad Naipaul’s forefathers, naturally brings us to why she has called his Bend in the River “a racist book”. I point out that her remark is likely to be quoted out of context to indicate the man rather than his book. “You think so?” she replies. “I’m sorry to hear that. He’s a great writer, which is why the book disappointed me.” And then she adds, with no real remorse, “Maybe I shouldn’t have said what I did, then.”

It’s nearing the end of my allotted time, and Gordimer hasn’t glanced at her watch more than once, purely out of habit, I assume. We’ve covered a lot of ground, talking about the small but growing Black South African middle class with particular reference to the software industry, the Indian middle class too (“I loved Mr Varma’s Great Indian Middle Class”), the shanties outside Kolkata airport, the plight of poor, unemployed young people who take to violence (not least in South Africa), why the South African cricket team may never have the required share of Black players, and why South African president in waiting Jacob Zuma’s motto is: Bring Me My AK-47 (“he doesn’t say it much now, though”). She has shown me a sketch her granddaughter made in Mumbai (“she sketches beautifully”), and a newspaper clipping about parallels between India’s long-standing democracy and South Africa’s still-nascent one.

I try to introduce Taslima Nasreen into the conversation, considering Gordimer has been on various anti-censorship boards, but she doesn’t respond, as I had hoped she would, with a brief tirade. Instead, her face aglow, she holds forth on how South Africa no longer has censorship, “except if someone actively preaches violence”. The pride on her face as she says this is proof enough, one feels, of a life less ordinary. Thank God she liked the questions.

(This was recorded in November 2008)

Yajnaseni Chakraborty is Features Editor, Hindustan Times.