Homeric-Thersitic

 

Robert H. Bell

 “But after all, what is the whole subject matter of that revered poem the Iliad but ‘the broils of foolish kings and the foolish populace’?”—Desiderius Erasmus (The Praise of Folly)

Human folly at Troy is rampant, starting with the Greek king and commander Agamemnon, who recklessly insults Achilles, refuses to apologize, and suddenly, inexplicably, decides to test the resolve of his army. Declaring the end of the siege, the king is flummoxed when his troops flock eagerly to their ships. The Greek cause ap­pears lost. Suddenly steps forth a remarkable, puzzling figure: “Thersites of the endless speech,” who “knew within his head many words, but disorderly;/vain, and without decency, to quarrel with the princes/with any word he thought might be amusing to the Argives.”

Who is Thersites? Not even Homer seems to know. The single orator in the Iliad unidentified by rank, patronymic, or place of origin, his name suggests “loud-mouth” and “courage,” in the sense of boldness, impudence. Reputedly the ugliest man at Troy, he surpasses his glowing, glowering peers for sheer repul­siveness. Since only one other Iliadic character is individuated by appearance and few ever described physically, the elaborate delineation of an apparently minor, fleeting figure is striking. The bard oddly highlights and seemingly undermines Thersites. De­formed and despised, Thersites seems utterly grotesque.

Despite conspicuous disqualifications, reviled Thersites seizes the stage and delivers a sixteen-line speech to the entire assembly. Astonishingly, this scorned freak publicly upbraids Agamemnon for greed and lust: you’ve already claimed valuable bronze and the choicest women, “whom we Achaians/give to you first of all whenever we capture some stronghold/Or is it still more gold you will be wanting, that some son/of the Trojans, breakers of horses, brings as ransom out of Ilion.” All this ransom and booty are the spoils “that I, or some other Achaian, capture and bring in? / Is it some young woman to lie with in love and keep her/all to yourself apart from the others? It is not right for/you, their leader, to lead in sorrow the sons of the Achaians.”

After excoriating Agamemnon, and flaunting the principles of rhetoric, Thersites assails his audience (“Achaian girls . . . women, not men”), repudiates their mission, and urges abandonment. Although Thersites’ rabble-rousing is unavailing, it provokes an immediate, decisive reaction from Odysseus, who abuses and scourges Thersites. Everyone laughs over him happily. Entertained and amused, the soldiers forget their incipient mutiny and return to ranks. So much, it seems, for Thersites, basest wretch at Troy. Humiliated, a pathetic, obnoxious creature, he disappears into oblivion. As is right and proper, according to Odysseus, and to most right-thinking people. Reading Homer in the nineteenth century, Prime Minister Gladstone found the speech “not a good one.”

Because Thersites is so flamboyantly over the top, he is not always credited for being on the mark. Critics tend to agree with the soldiers and Odysseus. They have marked Thersites’ ten­dentious description, his physical ugliness and moral turpitude. Is Thersites a monstrosity by heroic standards? Martin argues that the speech of Thersites, “quite literally, ‘without meter,’” is “over-determined to look bad by a number of criteria,” including slurring his words. Evidently “just an entertainer,” he “deserves no respect.”

Much like the Hephaestos sequence, another intervention by a disabled figure prompting mocking laughter, this episode is disconcerting, and fruitfully so. But ought we to dismiss Thersites so precipitately? Notwithstanding the soldiers’ contempt, the nar­rator’s malice, and the PM’s condescension, Thersites’ “words of revilement” are words of power provoking instant reaction from Odysseus. Thersites is no blithering madman or prating malcon­tent, and Agamemnon’s reckless conduct he himself eventually acknowledges as folly or madness, até. Impertinent yet pertinent, speaking truth to power, Thersites is seriously threatening. He says that Agamemnon “dishonoured Achilles, a man much better/than he is.” Thersites sarcastically echoes and ironically lauds Achilles: “there is no gall in Achilles’ heart, and he is forgiving.” Ha! “Oth­erwise,” he says to Agamemnon, “this were your last outrage.” Thersites locates (one might say) the Achilles heel of the antagonistic chiefs. Shrewdly, he recognizes the gravity of the king’s transgression, and intuits how close Agamemnon was to be­ing killed by the infuriated Achilles.

Laughed at, willing to “say any word he thought might be amusing,” Thersites is an unusual yet recognizable comic figure. Aristotle conceives comic types as “worse” than men are, mean­ing less admirable in appearance, character, and conduct. While “high mimetic” characters like Achilles live for an ideal (glory, say, or arête), “low mimetic” figures like Thersites are more fully embodied. Thersites’ physical freakishness exposes the sexual and appetitive motives of Agamemnon and Achilles, and for his pains is pummeled and harried. Aristotle’s brief remarks On Rhetoric, identifying three types of comic characters, bear upon Thersites. He is a buffoon, jesting to amuse others; he is an eiron, feigning ideals to mock Agamemnon; he is also an alazon or imposter, strutting and blustering to aggrandize himself.

It’s possible to regard Thersites as comic relief or as a foil to set off the solemnity of the heroes and their epic mission. In this view, Thersites is a lightning rod, like those Shakespearean commenta­tors who exist, observes William Empson pungently, “not at all to parody the heroes but to stop you from doing so: ‘If you want to laugh at this sort of thing laugh now and get it over.” Arguably, Thersites absorbs the destructive capability of purely derisive cynicism. To sustain a potent, viable heroic spirit, one might conclude, Homer inoculates his characters to resist more devastating, potentially fatal, strains of irony.

Though tempting, this model fails to account for the extent of Thersites’ disruptive force. Like Shakespeare who develops Thersites into a major character in Troilus and Cressida, Homer con­jures not a stock buffoon but a truth-teller, a wise fool. Certainly Thersites is foolish and reckless: “disorderly;/vain, and without decency,” he thwarts order, propriety, and decorum. Thersites presumes the fool’s remarkable license to speak harsh truths. However abusive and merciless, his invective is inventive and amusing. Thersites is a self-conscious performer, mocking the heroic enterprise and eviscerating his superiors. For which of course he pays the price. The fool is a scapegoat or pariah; ques­tioning the legitimacy of authority, he risks banishment (or worse) for what is always called impiety or treason. Odysseus castigates Thersites for “playing the fool,” threatens to cast him out “bare and howling,” and scourges the fool with Agamem­non’s royal scepter; thus the divine symbol of authority is literally the tool of enforcement.

If we are inclined to preserve authority or decorum, we can enjoy the spectacle and stress the anomaly of Thersites, so weirdly different from our heroes! Yet Thersites, “worst of Greeks,” echoes and recapitulates Achilles, pride of the Greeks; Thersites satirizes what Achilles epitomizes. The parallels are inescapable: at pre­cisely the same moment in Books 1 and 2, a character bursts out to attack the authorities. Vituperative, insulting, intemperate, they are reckless figures, kamikaze pilots, outraged and outrageous. Both assault Agamemnon and deprecate the soldiers. Each is isolated for his transgressions, Achilles in splendor, Thersites in ignominy. Thersites is a disgraceful, ridiculous caricature of the hero’s tragic grandeur, greater stature and complexity. To regard Thersites as a conventional foil makes sense but begs the question: why does Homer make Thersites so eerily like Achilles in several minute particulars?

A more subversive possibility is that Thersites is Achilles’ second self. In satirizing and parodying the hero, Thersites dem­onstrates intimate familiarity and implicit affinity with Achilles. Agamemnon tells Achilles that he speaks “abusively,” that “forever quarrelling is dear to your heart,” while Thersites is known for the “shrill noise of his abuse,” and his propensity to “quarrel with princes.” Achilles “dashed to the ground the sceptre,” that emblem of authority used by Odysseus to thrash Thersites. Even more telling is the similarity of their articu­lation. Both say that Agamemnon hogs the booty and demands the prettiest concubines. Both claim to fight nobly, to deliver captives. Each urges the troops to return home, and both remark that it will teach Agamemnon a sorely-need lesson. Both Thersites and Achilles “quarrel with the princes”—in Greek (though not in Lattimore’s translation) the same phrase is used for both. Thersites repeats Achilles verbatim at certain points.

Such multiple correspondences between Thersites and Achil­les are far more elaborate than necessary to contrast epic hero and satiric slanderer. Alarmingly, the basest wretch too exactly parallels the exalted hero, as if Thersites intuits Achilles’ feelings and speaks on his behalf, closely echoing several sentiments. Not even the exigencies of oral poetry explain why or how Thersites concludes his speech, “Otherwise, son of Atreus, this were your last outrage”—a daring, rash threat reiterating Achilles word for word. That last utterance is quite uncanny, since Thersites was not present to hear Achilles.

While Thersites parodies or satirizes Achilles, once can see that he functions as a double or doppelganger, a version of Achilles seen through a glass darkly. With such evocative affinities hero and outcast are a little more than kin. We’ve seen that Thersites’ abuse is hyperbolic, over-the-top, yet apposite, spot on. Both in what he says (he “knew within his head many words,”) and what he is, Thersites doubles meanings. Thersites’ parody humorously degrades the sublime. Homer’s he­roic and mock-heroic elements are imbricated. Thersites is a dark shadow of Achilles, sacrificed instead of the untouchable hero: Perhaps Achilles is a tragic, as Thersites is a comic, scapegoat.

Disabled like Hephaestos, Thersites is enabled too. Thersites is an avatar of comic energy that disrupts events, complicates issues, eludes closure, and generates inquiry. One particularly slippery Homeric crux suggests a calculated ambiguity of identity. The Greeks, we are told, “were furiously angry with him, their minds resentful. (Latimore translation).” Or, “furious with him, deeply offended”(Fagles translation). Angry or furious with whom? Alexander Pope makes clear that the Greeks were “Vext” at/with Thersites. But in Greek, the pronoun reference is ambiguous; the soldiers could be angry with either Thersites or Agamemnon. Leaf’s massive commentary says “clearly Agamemnon,” that Thersites is “at the moment the accepted spokesman of the mob, who are indignant with Agamemnon.” Surely that meaning is available. “Homer is here conveying the idea of general Achaian support for Achil­leus’ stance,” articulated by Thersites and supported by ordinary soldiers, says Norman Postlethwaite. If so, the fickle mob experi­ences fluctuating sympathies, more various and complex attitudes than simple derision.

Typically fools are marginal characters, heedless of social im­peratives, challenging hierarchy, flouting norms, turning things topsy-turvy. A mocker and a jester, Thersites is Homer’s wise fool and crucial chorus. Repulsive and pathetic, outrageous and ridicu­lous, his trenchant critique is potent. This isn’t merely detrimental to morale; it is seditious and subversive. That Thersites strikes a nerve, and threatens the whole enterprise, is evident in Odysseus’ heavy-handed over-kill. It’s not just that Odysseus lacks humor or cannot suffer fools gladly. Thersites raises substantive issues that are tellingly ignored by Odysseus and essentially unanswerable. Without really responding to Thersites’ argument, Odysseus orates, not very persuasively. After Thersites’ sinewy and insinuating lan­guage, Odysseus sounds bombastic and flaccid. In Homer’s Greek, he crudely threatens to expose Thersites’ genitals.

In the inauspicious person of Thersites, Homer endows the disloyal opposition. Many-minded Homer is—I have argued—far more receptive to humor and sympathetic to Thersites than his crit­ics, as Pope recognized: “there is nothing in this Speech but what might have become the mouth of Nestor himself, if you except a word or two. And had Nestor spoken it, the Army had certainly set sail for Greece; but because it was utter’d by a ridiculous Fel­low whom they are ashamed to follow, they are not reduc’d, and satisfy’d to continue the Seige.” Pope’s translation conveys the blazing force of Thersites—the fearless, foolish satirist whose “wit­ty malice” Pope cherishes and emulates in his “own” satires.

 Thersites only clamour’d in the throng,

Loquacious, loud, and turbulent of Tongue:

Aw’d by no shame, by no respect controul’d,

In scandal busy, in reproaches bold;

With witty malice studious to defame,

Scorn all his joy, and laughter all his aim.

But chief he glory’d with licentious style

To lash the great, and monarchs to revile.

At first he seems to endorse the heroic code; gradually Thersites reveals the iron fist beneath the velvet glove. “Whate’er our master craves, submit we must,/Plagu’d with his pride, or punished for his lust.” The damning truth condemns Agamemnon, locked into that couplet rhyming “submit we must” and “punished for his lust.”

Thersites is bright and brassy, insufferable and indispensable. He defies constraints and turns things topsy-turvy. Adroit at im­personation, an acute parodist, he marches to his own rhythms. There is a nice comic reversal with a satiric twist: introduced as one who loves to provoke laughter, Thersites leaves to jeering laugh­ter. But this humor ricochets and boomerangs: if the mocker is mocked, so is the audience. Thersitic energies are both centrifugal and centripetal. No wonder Thersites provokes such intense and disparate reactions from commentators: he has multiple purposes and contradictory consequences. Values clash like contending war­riors. Homer’s technique is dialogic and dialectical. Thersites and Odysseus debate fundamental principles of heroic conduct.

Homer suggests that the sublime and the ridiculous are much closer than single-minded Odysseus can afford to believe. The Thersites se­quence is a midnight foray from the heroic fields of glory to the shifting terrain of startling satiric humour, not a comfortable place to stand but a vantage point Homer insists we visit.

Robert H. Bell is Frederick Latimer Wells Professor of English, Williams College, Massachusetts.

Narrativisationalities of Ribaldian Discourse

Dilip Simeon

This is my Rifle and that is my Gun,
This is for shooting and that is for fun.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text,
Discourse for this life, and Text for the next.

Ethnicity, Felicity, Moment of Poesis,
Deploying Derrida, contrive halitosis.
Deconstruct Narratives, re-inventing the Nation,
Imagining India, maximise obfuscation.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text..etc

Field Marshal editor, Subaltern mate,
Retrieving the Body, what fun to relate.
Self from the Occident, Other from East,
Apply your Mind to know Beauty from Beast.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun..etc

This is my Thesis and that my curricula,
Voyaging westwards, remain perpendicular.
Narrativize textuality of sexuality,
Canonize Prurience of Orientality.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text..etc

Archaeological Silences, scatalogical noise,
Knowledge is Power, wear it with poise.
Positing Subject, we wish to sublate,
Delivering seminar, we sit and rotate.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun…etc

Eros, Telos, Nemesis, Mimesis,
Mug up my jargon for passing your thesis.
Alas ! Alack ! the subversifying Mind,
Earning hard currency, so hard to find.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc

Mentalitie and Problematique,
Academic fashions need a boutique
Matriarch, Patriarch, theme for research,
Mantra and Tantra from ivory perch.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun..etc

Subliminalities of subtextualities,
Ponder pomposities of prolix verbosities.
Problematising the hidden thematic,
Metatextualising intellectuals Asiatic.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc

Locating, Migrating, mastering Said,
Oriental professor wants to get —–.
Multicultural interpenetration,
Metropolitan colonial wants integration.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun…etc

Ethnographics of phantasmagoria,
Induce seances of mental euphoria.
While translating the palimpsest tender,
Oh how I long for the opposite gender.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc

Overinterpreting marxist constipation,
Wallow in post-modern self flagellation.
Transposing observer to popular stance,
Overdetermining professorial romance.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun..etc

Agenda of subtext needs corrigendum,
Traversing terrain of ethnic pudendum.
Verbs become nouns, with lightening velocity,
Opaqueness of meaning, euphonic ferocity.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc

Excavating silences, admiring the skirt,
Unearthing allegories of lexico-inert.
Pluralisms of syncretistic exterior,
Massaging advisors’ psychic interior.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun…etc

Dissecting semiotics of peasant Tebhaga,
Fieldworking students need munim dhaga.
But how to explain to examiners’ team,
The subtler uses of dhaga munim.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc

Teasing long hidden truths if I may,
Bribing chaprasis how can I say.
Slog long enough, material will out,
By which time victory will turn into rout.
This is my Rifle and that is my Gun…etc

Elementary aspects of peasant insurgency
Turmoil underneath causing slight divergency.
Inverting reality only goes to show,
Faculty wanting History from below.
This is my Discourse, and that is my Text…etc.

Dilip Simeon is a labour historian, political activist and chairperson of the Aman Trust.  He is the author of  Revolution Highway (Penguin India, 2010).


Courtesans in the Academia?

 

Basuli Deb

The National Women’s Studies Association in the US selected “Outsider Feminisms” as one of the sub-themes for their annual conference at Denver, Colorado, in November 2010. The conference itself was themed “Difficult Dialogues II” in continuation with the previous year’s topic. Drawing on outsider feminisms as a mode of critique, this was an attempt to engage in difficult dialogues around the performative arts which have been the disenfranchised areas of feminist inquiry within the US academia.

In this context, I often keep on wondering how such dispossession is intensified in the context of transnational encounters between US academic feminism and the figure of the woman artist from beyond the borders? So, I thought I’d revisit Muzaffar Ali’s film Umrao Jaan (1981), based on Mirza Muhammad Hadi Ruswa’s 1905 Urdu novel Umrao Jan Ada about the life of the nineteenth century dancer courtesan, Umrao Jaan and think through the issue.  Is it possible for performative feminism to get an entry into feminist inquiry by way of US film studies? So, this is an attempt to think and if possible, reinvent the position and role of outsider feminisms (like performative feminisms) within the structures of the academia. The larger question is about internal disciplinary hierarchies and boundaries within social sciences and humanities and ultimately about the politics of the job market.

First, using the film Umrao Jaan as our lens, I’d like to think about the relationship in which feminist performative art, especially those embedded in a non Euro-American tradition, stands with respect to Women’s Studies and Women’s and Gender Studies departments/programs in the US. Transnational feminism happens to be the current buzzword within feminist inquiry, and departments and programs look cutting edge and frankly fashionable when such an area of feminist inquiry is introduced. But how has transnational feminism, with its strong affiliations with the idea of crossing borders, incorporated the figure of the woman artist from beyond the Euro-American cultural tradition? What is transnational feminism’s response to women artists, such as Umrao Jaan, who inhabit the courts of the Muslim aristocracy in the nineteenth century British empire in India? How much interest does transnational feminism have in getting to know the lives of these women courtesans who were caught in the double bind of being highly valued as artists and defamed as prostitutes? Why such women, despite their tragic stories of abduction from their natal families and being sold into prostitution, not eligible for entry into feminist studies, while human trafficking is becoming an increasingly significant area of feminist analysis? To draw on Audre Lorde’s famous description of multiple social locations of disenfranchisement for women, Umrao Jaan is perhaps the “sister outsider” of feminist studies; the likes of her hardly enter feminist inquiry, and more so when she belongs not to the underclass of Europe or America, but to the margins of the Indian aristocracy. What other factors make it so hard for some one like Umrao to enter the realm of feminist inquiry in the US academia?

It is true that performance itself remains largely an untheorized and neglected area within feminist scholarship. But Umrao, in her relationship with Nawab Sultan, also embodies romantic love between an aristocrat and a courtesan that has little hope for culminating into wedded bliss. “Under western eyes” Umrao Jaan could have been lumped with the motley crowd of “Third World women”, rendered faceless and homogenous by their victim status. But Chandra Mohanty has already dismantled the authority of such feminisms by exposing the underlying imperialist, and by extension racist, assumptions that mark them. Umrao Jaan could possibly have entered the domain of feminist inquiry as the woman artist, but her art speaks another language—incomprehensible to US academic feminism with its meager interest in cultural studies and art forms outside the Euro-American tradition. This is true even when positions in Women’s Studies and Women’s and Gender Studies programs and departments are opened up in transnational feminism. Contemporary art forms from elsewhere can still make an entry into the rarefied world of academic feminism, but the likes of Umrao Jaan, with their classical traditions and aristocratic affiliations, rarely do.

Umrao’s chosen dance form, the mujra, as we know, sprang during the Mughal period and was heavily patronized by India’s Muslim aristocracy. Mujra is a hybrid form that the pre-sixteenth century theatrical storytellers routinely performed in the courtyards of the Hindu temples space. In mujra, kathak intersect with the vocal musical forms of the thumri and the ghazal. The thumri is the musical form which has an intimate and material relationship of women for Lord Krishna. Pangs of loss or separation, so central to the internal dynamics of the workings of the genre of the ghazal, takes a more formal shape sometime in the sixth century. Umrao, who performs the mujra for the royalty and the aristocracy of India, represents an excess in the realm of feminist inquiry—the sister outsider, debarred from entry even into the domain of transnational feminism, with its strong affiliations with the elsewhere—beyond the borders of the familiar. She is not Phoolan Devi—the bandit queen of India—the beloved of transnational feminist inquiry into Bollywood—the lower caste woman, the outlaw of the postcolonial state, the sensational exception to the rule of Third World women’s victimhood that “Western feminism” loves. Her nuanced, median position becomes her undoing even in the highly slotted academic space as it used to be in her known world.

But what if Umrao Jaan tries to enter the realm of critical inquiry via an analytic of the British Empire in India in the nineteenth century? It is in the context of the 1857 series of wars between the British and the natives of India and the British repression of resistance against foreign rule that we need to understand the figure of Umrao. The British, in their imperial interests to rule India, annexed large territories of the princely states by dethroning the native kings of the region, often by claiming that they were inefficient rulers because their lives were spent in debauchery rampant in the Indian courts. Ray’s Satranj ki Khiladi graphically demonstrates how tactically the British did engage in this game of chess with the Nawab of the northeastern kingdom of Oudh and ousted him eventually. The British East India Company forcefully annexed Oudh by deposing its last independent ruler, Wajid Ali Shah, in 1856. This was one of the reasons that led to the outbreak of native resistance to British rule in 1857 in that part of the emerging nation. The film shows that what seemed to the British inefficiency in the royal courts, was actually a different kind of relationship between the ruler and the ruled—one based on kinship relations rather than bureaucratic control. What was debauchery was an atmosphere of court patronage of the arts. It is this Oudh of 1856 where Umrao Jaan lives and performs her art. She is the woman artist whose art is threatened by British imperial interests and its imposition of Victorian morality. She loses her courtly profession and is compelled to flee when the British invade the court in Oudh where she has lived as a courtesan for years. The British render her destitute. She is the outsider artist in the British Empire.

But her art becomes a site and action of resistance as well. After losing her livelihood she returns to her family, only to be rejected by them for her profession. However, she continues to perform her art as and when she receives a request for a mujra. Her performances continue to create feminine spaces of labor that contest prevalent schemas of moral order. At the same time the woman artist makes a statement against aristocratic court patronage and indigenous varieties of patriarchy. One particular number in the film, “In ankhon ki masti ke mastane hazaron hain”, for instance, (these intoxicating eyes draw many admirers), critiques the plight of the woman artist whose life draws romantic attention from numerous men, but at the end is relegated to recount a life of solitary existence. Men like Nawab Sultan might fall deeply in love with the likes of Umrao, but all the same they leave her to marry other women according to the dictates of a proper aristocratic marriage.

In the light of the above, I reiterate the question: What if Umrao Jaan tries to enter the realm of critical inquiry as the woman artist in the context of the British Empire in India? In a post 9/11 world postcolonialism’s position in the US academia has become even more suspect, at the same time as it has become even more important to use the anti-imperialist tools of postcolonialism to critically question the US academic project of scholarship and pedagogy. It has become crucial to identify what values have entered the academia in the context of a world that has created lists about the most dangerous US intellectuals—many of whom are postcolonialists! Postcolonialism is remarkable slippery and glamorous and its precise dubiousness paradoxically leads to its being cutting edge.

Umrao Jaan might enter the world of the US academia via a rhetoric of anti-imperialism, but from such a space marked by its ties to a transnational feminist vision, she is unlikely to create any dialogue with the world of US film studies, with its heavy emphasis on European and American cinema. Postcolonial cinema, such as Umrao Jaan (and the text has even more remote chance of being accepted in the canon), is fated to remain an outsider. It is terribly hard to recognize the postcolonial woman artist of color from elsewhere as a legitimate figure within the white washed walls of the US academia, within the recognized entry points that are currently available. She has inherited the legacies of prodigies like the eighteenth century African-American poet, Phyllis Wheatley, who likewise had to prove before the Boston Brahmins her legitimacy in the world of letters, not as a poet, but as a black poet.

It is thus surprising that the majority of students and scholars who want desperately to work on the likes of Umrao Jaan, a lot of them South Asian scholars who came to the US as international students, do so neither through Women’s and Gender Studies programs/departments, nor through film studies. They are either recruited/hired as students pursuing postcolonial studies or postcolonialists, specializing in postcolonial cinema, rather than film studies hires. Alternatively, they enter the US academia through South Asian studies programs that embrace a cultural studies perspective. These programs remain outsiders in the world of the US academia. Nonetheless, students and scholars working from within these departments and programs constantly remind the US academia that it still has a lot of listening to do. I am not sure whether they essentially do the listening bit too without being patronizing. These areas nevertheless remind us about the tactical defining of fields of knowledge that academics embrace as legitimate and fields that are systematically marginalized and excluded. The power structures in academia are insidious and deep seated. In this case, racial thinking and slotting in niches go a long way. This game is manifest enough, notwithstanding our moments of denial. Even as we critique those who are out to muzzle humanities and the social sciences, it would not be a bad idea to take a pause and look inwards into own complicity in this whole affair.

[A version of this article was presented on the panel “Performative Feminisms and Outsider Interventions” at the National Women’s Studies Association’s annual conference in November 2010 at Denver, Colorado]

Basuli Deb is Assistant Professor, Department of English, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

Lunatic Asylums Arrive in Calcutta

Amit Ranjan Basu

The arrival of psychiatry in India was a disjuncture from the practices that already existed for mental healing. Not only were these practices based on concepts that did not follow the Cartesian mind/body binary, but I also consider it inappropriate to call those practices psychiatry though many historians of Indian medicine do. It is one thing to use ’mental health’ or ’psychiatry’ or ’psychology’ interchangeably as a rhetoric while elaborating on indigenous systems in English, but to reduce different culturally saturated practices with their own terminologies to an all-engulfing western word psychiatry, is another. For, it tends to produce a narrative that simplistically brings psychiatry in a line where pre-colonial systems at once lose their characteristics and any autonomous domain.

It is not true that mad persons were not confined in houses before the colonialists came. A brief historical overview on the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912 mentioned Mahmud Khilji (1436-69), who established a ’mental hospital’ at Dhar, near Mandu in Madhya Pradesh with Maulana Fazular Lah Hakim as the appointed physician.’[1] In fact, the concept of hospitals was first conceived and practised in Arabian medicine in all the countries ruled by Muslims, and served as a model for the European hospitals. The first such hospital was founded by Walid b. Abdal Malik in AD 707.

Two types of hospitals emerged. One was the ’fixed hospital’ located in particular places and the other, the ’mobile’ one that used to move from place to place and stopped at one place as long as it was necessary. Insane persons were kept locked up and chained in hospitals specified for them under regular supervision. Firuz Shah, successor of Mohmmad Bin Tuglak, added several hospitals to a list of 70 hospitals run by his predecessor in Delhi. Firuz Shah had ordered that everyone suffering from insanity should be captured, chained and kept in the hospital and treated with medicine ’prescribed by him’ which was found ’useful’. Moreover, he also provided a ’special diet’ for them.[2] In any case, it is not very difficult to imagine that wandering and violent people were kept in custody and not many hospitals for the insane came up as it happened with British colonialists, who brought in a rational system of western medicine, which saw a growth of many institutions by the mid-eighteenth century.

Arrangements for keeping lunatics under private care but with the East India Company’s patronage had started by the late-eighteenth century in Calcutta. The first recorded evidence for it can be dated to 1787. D.G. Crawford, who wrote A History of the Indian Medical Service, 1600-1913 in two volumes, gave a brief account of the establishment of this lunatic asylum in Calcutta:

“The proceeding of the Calcutta Medical Board of 3rd April 1887, contain a memorial from surgeon G. M. Kenderdine in charge of the Insane Asylum …[t]he Board recommended to Government, in a letter dated 7th May 1787 the foundation of a regular asylum and nominated Assistant Surgeon William Dick to its charge … Dick was appointed on a salary of Rs. 200 per month. A Bengal Military letter dated 16th August 1787, reports in para 108-’Lunatic Hospital. Have accepted the proposals of Mr. Dick, an Asstt. Surgeon for the erection of one. The House (sic) is to be built at his Expense (sic) and rented by the company at Rs. 400 per month’ . A General letter from Bengal dated 6th November 1788, reports in para 98 that sanction has been given to the erection of a Lunatic Hospital for females, for which a rent of 200 rupees a month will be paid.”[3]

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the ’trade in lunacy’ became a lucrative business for England and India. In Calcutta, a surgeon, Mr Beardsmore entered into a contract with the Government of Bengal, which lasted for 30 years, and the government provided from about Rs. 20,000-40,000 per year for taking care of, on an average, 20-40 lunatics. Compared to the Hanwell Asylum of England, the average cost per patient was seven to eight times more here![4] The asylum came up in Calcutta in 1817 exclusively for Europeans. Unlike the previous one, which had to close down, this asylum still exists in the city as the Institute of Psychiatry. Let us look at its emergence narrated by an Indian psychiatrist 50 years ago:

“ [I]n 1817, Surgeon Mr. Beardsmore who was superintendent of a Government Lunatic Asylum found that the conditions in the lunatic hospital were not congenial for the patients and so he decided to erect the lunatic asylum at the outskirts of Calcutta immediately behind the Presidency Jail. This was solely due to the enterprise and enthusiasm of Mr. Beardsmore and the hospital was a private property. It was meant exclusively for Europeans. Govt. contributed five-sixth of its expenses while one-sixth was met by the contributions of the private patients themselves. When the hospital was started Mr. Beardsmore had hardly half a dozen patients but soon they increased to 50-60 in number. The asylum had a central house surrounded by several ranges of barracks, which were thrown together in no very definite plan but were added from time to time to suit the needs of the public. Every visitor was pleased with the cleanliness of the apartments and ventilation of the rooms. The gardens were beautiful and had a pleasing and refreshing appearance. Patients looked happy, cheerful and comfortable. The asylum was managed by a European superintendent and a steward. There was an Apothecary to look after the male patients and a Matron to watch the female patients. Restraint was in use but it was in extreme moderation. Excited patients were treated with morphia, opium and hot baths. Sometimes leeches had to be applied to such patients in order to alloy their excitements but venesection was never done. Blisters were found useful in chronic patients as it helped them to shorten the duration of their periodic excitements.”[5]

By early nineteenth century, the Court of Directors of East India Company decided to build lunatic asylums for native criminal and freely wandering insane persons in Bengal. Government records show that in 24 Parganas near the jail at Russapuglah, a plan was being sanctioned in 1804 to build an asylum for receiving 50-60 insane natives within a budget of Rs 7,500. One native doctor, one jamadar, eight peons, two cooks, two matores and two bhisties totalling a cost of Rs 84 per month manned it.[6] However, within two decades, the situation at Russapuglah asylum deteriorated and patients started dying frequently. A member of the Medical Board, Mr Gillman, visited the place and reported:

“The site of it is very bad being surrounded by jungle, swamps, jeels, pools from earth has been excavated for making bricks etc. etc. In short, I believe a worse situation could not be found. The buildings are low and damp and not half-large enough for the number of patients, to which must be attributed the numerous deaths that occur there.”[7]

The Russapuglah asylum continued to be crowded and a report in 1834 showed 267 patients with an expense of Rs 8,011, anna 0 and paisa 9. Though the number of staff was increased to 44, there still remained only one native doctor and one jamadar!’[8]

Till the mid-nineteenth century, most of the official records did not reflect any discussion on medical observations apart from nominal counts of patients and their occupations. Most of it was related to the issue of establishment and expenses. But the population distribution of the patients admitted shows that they were also coming from the adjacent districts apart from the city, and that these admissions were influenced by the policing of wandering lunatics in the streets. However, the large number of patients from poorer classes also indicates that the marker of insanity and its treatment promoted by the colonialists was also gaining ground. After the revolt of 1857, when the colonial power was transferred from the East India Company to the Queen in 1858, and with the Penal and Criminal Procedure Code, came the Act No. 36 of 1858, which provided for better control and management of lunatics. Actually three Acts came together with the Queen’s proclamation. First, the Lunacy (Supreme Courts) Act of 1858; second, the Lunacy (Districts Courts) Act of 1858; and third, the Indian Lunatic Asylums Act of 1858. The racial and class prejudice that was the hallmark of colonial governance took effect in the colonial policy where people from lower class and caste were provided uneven service compared to the white, rich men. While reviewing the reports on lunatic asylums in Bengal Presidency, T. Hastings records:

“Cruel as the natives of India naturally are both to man and to beast, cruelty to lunatics is not one of their characteristics; and in a subsequent page we shall propose to use the feeling of compassion which possesses them, in a plan we have to offer for the future advantage of the Hindustan [emphasis mine].”[9]

Hastings seems to be quite amazed as to how a ’naturally’ cruel people could have such compassion for lunatics, which Europeans did not have! The new law provided power to the Magistrates to detain any person suffering from insanity after proper certification by a medical practitioner. More than dealing with the subject, the law provided in detail for both regulating the reception of the patients as well as their administrative management. Patched up with phrases borrowed from the European asylum reformers, it claimed to further the concept of non-restraint in the Indian asylums, using chains and straitjackets in only exceptional cases. However, it also created new administrative problems when superintendents of the asylums started complaining against the Magistrates about not only the latter’s incapacity to judge insanity, but also about remaining open to any certification of lunacy, and dumping individuals in the asylum. Interestingly enough, superintendents complained, in rhetoric of human rights, that they were being forced to illegally detain persons who were not insane!

Amit Ranjan Basu is an independent researcher in social psychiatry.


 [1] O. Somasundram, ’The Indian Lunacy Act, 1912: A Historic Background’, Indian Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 29(1), 1987, p. 5.

[2] Muhammad Zubayr Siddiqi, Studies in Arabic and Persian Medical Literature, Calcutta, 1959, pp. xiii-xxxvi. Compared to studies in Ayurveda, history of Islamic medicine or Unani in India is much less in number despite having existed for 700 years! In medieval India, there are ample pieces of evidence of free exchange between these two systems. For Unani (Greco-Arab) medicine in India, also see M.Z. Siddiqi, ’The Unani Tibb (Greek Medicine) in India’, Islamic Culture, Vol. XLII(3), 1968, pp. 161-72; S.A. Hosseini, ‘An Elementary Study of the Principles of Individual and Group Psychotherapy and Mental Health in Islam’, Indian J Psychiatry, Vol. 25(4), 1983, pp. 335- 37 ; M.S. Khan, ’Arabic and Persian Source Materials for the History of Science in Medieval India’, Islamic Culture, Vol. LXII(2-3), 1988, pp. 113-39; Byron Good and Mary Jo Del Veechio Good, ’The Comparative Study of Greco-Islamic Medicine: The Integration of Medical Knowledge into Local Symbolic Contexts’, in Charles Leslie and Allan Young, eds, Paths to Asian Medical Knowledge, Delhi, 1993, pp. 255-71; Kristin L. Bright, The Travelling Tonic: Tradition, Commodity and the Body in Unani (Greco-Arab) Medicine in India, Ann Arbor, 2000; and Neshat Quaiser, ’Politics, Culture and Colonialism: Unani’s Debate with Doctory’, in Biswamoy Pati and Mark Harrison, eds, Health, Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on Colonial India, 2001, pp. 317-55.

[3] D.G. Crawford, History of Indian Medical Service, Vol. 2, London, 1914, p. 395.

[4] Waltraud Ernst, ’The Rise of the European Lunatic Asylum in Colonial India (1750-1858)’, Bulletin of the Indian Institute of History of Medicine, Vol. XVII, 1987, pp. 95-96; ’Asylum Provision and the East India Company in the Nineteenth Century’, Medical History, Vol. 42, 1998, pp. 478-81; and ’The Madras Lunatic Asylum in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Bulletin of the Indian Institute of History of Medicine, Vol. XXVIII, 1998,pp. 15-18.

[5] L.P. Varma, ’History of Psychiatry in India and Pakistan’, Indian J Psychiatry, Vol. 4(1-4), 1953, p. 33.

[6] West Bengal State Archives (WBSA), Judicial Department, Criminal Branch Proceedings (JCP), Nos 17-20, 1804, Police Office, Calcutta, to George Dowdeswell, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, 5 Aug. 1804.

[7] WBSA, JCP, No. 3, 1818, W.B. Bayley, Acting Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary to the Medical Board, 17 Mar. 1818.

[8] WBSA, JCP, Nos 1-15, 1835, I.H. Patton, Magistrate of the 24 Pergunnahs, to W.H. Macnaughten, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, 17 Mar. 1835.

 [9] T. Hastings, ’Lunatic Asylums in Bengal’, Calcutta Review, Vol. 26(52), 1856, p. 592.

[1o] WBSA, General Department, Medical Branch Proceedings, Nos 39-45, May 1860, F.J. Mouat, Inspector General of Jails, Lower Provinces, to E.H. Lushington, Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, 20 Aug. 1859.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Who is a Malayali Anyway?

G. Arunima

In 1806, an Anglican priest called Claudius Buchanan travelled to Kerala from Bengal to understand the relationship between Hindus, Jews and Christians there. In a letter that he wrote back home to one Sandys (possibly a colleague), Buchanan declares: “the bonds of infidelity and superstition are loosening fast.” In an extraordinary travelogue, collected and edited in several volumes of memoirs, he describes the different religious groups he met all over Travancore, their histories as he understood them, and what he saw to be their most distinctive attributes. What makes this fascinating ethnography remarkable is the complexity of Buchanan’s point of view. He was at once an Anglican amongst Syrians and Latin Catholics, a white missionary amongst co-religionists of a different race, an observer with a partisan interest in spreading the word. Buchanan’s meticulously maintained diary becomes one of the earliest accounts of the religious complexity of Kerala, which is often taken for granted without adequate scrutiny in contemporary discussions of the region and its past. It is a different matter that his narratives also throw a light on the emergence of print technology and public sphere in Kerala. But that is another story.

Buchanan narrates a delightful tale of his meeting with the priests (kasheesha) and elders in Mavelikara. Initially they were suspicious of whether he was a Christian at all and what his motivations were. Moreover, they were perturbed by his suggestions that they should translate their bible! They said that they could not depart from their bible because it was the true Bible of Antioch we have had in the mountains of Malabar for fourteen hundred years, or longer. They questioned Buchanan and his Western translations and in order to convince themselves that he was a true Christian and the copies he carried with him reliable. They set about to compare four copies of the third chapter of St. Mathew’s Gospel, in Eastern and Western Syrian, English and one Thomas’s translation in Malayalam. At the end of the exercise they found that all the translations were fine, except for the one into Malayalam. They had never seen a printed Syriac New Testament before and were astonished to see one, but every priest took a turn to read a portion from it, which they did fluently. Most of the places had ancient copies of the Scriptures, or of some part of them. Of these, the texts most commonly read were the Oreta, or the former part of the Old Testament, the Evangelion, the Praxeis and the Egarta. The Prophets were the rarest.

In Buchanan’s account, despite the initial resistance, most of the priests were amenable to the idea of translating the Bible into Malayalam. In a letter to one Henry Thornton on 24 December 1806 he writes, “Syrian is still their sacred language,and some of the laymen understand it; but the Malayalim[sic] is the vulgar tongue. I proposed to send a Malayalim translation of the Bible to each of the Churches; and they assured me, that every man who could write would be glad to make a copy for his own family.” They also assured him that they would establish schools in each parish for Christian instruction in Malayalam, which would be undertaken by four of the chief elders there, where the Bible in Malayalam would be the principle text book.

Two issues become apparent at this point. One, the complex mediation of Christianity in Kerala via the intervention of the Western church to the extent that even the idea of making the Bible available to the average parishioner in Malayalam appears to have come from outside. The second: that the initial need for print technology here, as in the case of Europe, too, seems to be coming from the desire to increase the circulation of the Bible. These two matters: that of language and of an emergent print culture has been central to discussions of modernity and the creation of ethnic identities, principally that of nationalism. But about that some other day. But the contemporary issues of Malayali identity also crucially go back to the pre-colonial interactions and today I’d like to talk about the originary myths of one particular group: the Syrian Christians.

For more than a thousand years Jews, Christians, Muslims and Hindus have lived together in Kerala.  By the 20th century, the term Malayali was used to designate all these people across community or caste difference.  In fact, as soon as Kerala is viewed within the wider social geography of the Indian Ocean—an all together  different ‘regional space,’ the story about the insider/and outsider, belonging and identity take a different meaning. 

If we examine Kerala’s history as the narrative of these different groups as an integral part of its social fabric, what is immediately evident is that such a cultural mix was possible only because Kerala was connected to an extended network: from the Arab world on the west towards China on the east with large parts of the present South East Asia linked to it through established networks of trade.  This connection meant that Kerala not only nurtured a vibrant commercial culture but also that it had become home to people from diverse parts of this world, with their different cultural practices and belief systems.  From religion and ritual, dietary and culinary practices, and new technological inputs,  to a rich history of loan words that are an integral part of present day Malayalam language, today’s Kerala is shaped by the history of its geographical positioning. 

We gain an interesting tapestry if we consider the ‘origin myths’ about the arrival of the Jews, Syrian Christians, Mappilla Muslims and Nambudiri Brahmins – the four main groups that came and settled in Kerala somewhere between the  4th and 9th centuries CE. By juxtaposing conventional histories of Kerala with these stories of arrival and settlement, by means of trying to understand this complex past, one also hopes to isolate moments and contexts that are indicative of rather assertive religious identities at certain points of time.

One of the significant foundational moments for each of the three Semitic religions seems to have been the moment of arrival in Kerala.  In all these ‘origin myths’ under scrutiny here, it is significant that, for the Jews, Christians and Muslims, their arrival in Kerala is remembered as part of a momentous welcome.  Therefore, unlike the mnemonics of trauma and repression (especially within the Judaic tradition, and persecution in their homeland in the case of the Cananite Christians) that might be part of their historical memory in their lands of origin, what we witness in Kerala is a reversal of this ‘historical consciousness.’

Lets consider Christianity, which has had a rich and complex history within Kerala. By the 20th century, almost all the major Christian schisms and sects have found a presence within Kerala. The “Syrians” claim two broad divisions amongst themselves – one the Western Syrians, who claim Apostolic descent from St. Thomas, and the other, the Eastern Syrians, who trace their origins from Thomas of Cana.  Unlike the Portuguese Jesuits who arrived on the west coast in the 16th century, the Syrian Christians were not missionary and do not appear to have been proselytizers.  In fact, within their own self-perception they see themselves as the descendants of the first settlers. It is of course perfectly possible, especially when examining the degree of shared life cycle rituals, that many original residents in the region would have become followers of this new religion.  In fact, one of the earliest periods of “religious crisis” that we find on the Kerala coast was provoked by the Portuguese who targeted all three groups – Jews, Christians and Muslims – but it was the Syrian Christians who were probably the worst affected by this encounter.  However, in the history of religions in Kerala, with the arrival of the Portuguese one finds the establishment of the Latin church too, and until the mid 19th century arrival of the Protestant missions from England and Germany, Christianity in Kerala was primarily “Nestorian” or Roman Catholic.

If one examines the ‘origin myths’ we witness certain repetitive themes and motives among all the four groups that I have mentioned.  In the Syrian Christian narratives of origin the most important is the Apostolic genealogy.  Referred to originally as the St. Thomas Christians (as a result of the tradition that the church was set up by the Apostle, St. Thomas) these followers of the Eastern Church claim to be the descendants of upper castes (principally Brahmin) converted to Christianity by St. Thomas himself.  The point of entry of the Apostle in India is also debated within ecclesiastical histories. Some claim that the Kerala coast was the original point of entry whereas others say that he lived and died on the Coromandel coast, and that the people were the descendants of those Christians who migrated westwards from there. 

However, the more important issue here is that as the original Christians, these people claimed a presence in India from a period almost contemporaneous with that of Christ.  The next critical event in this tradition is the contact with the Eastern Syrian church with the arrival of Thomas of Cana, known as Cnai Thoma or Thomman within the Christian narrative.  He appears variously as a merchant, traveller and pilgrim, and is meant to have brought a group of Christians with him at a time when clearly there were waves of anti-Christian persecution in their homeland. 

According to the Canaanite legend, Thomas set about transforming Kodungallur, organizing it as a Christian community around a church.  These two divergent points of origin within the collective memory of the St. Thomas Christians are probably responsible for their endogamous divisions:  vadakambhagakkar [Northists] and tekkumbhagakkar [Southists]. 

An early 18th century tradition by a Jacobite priest named Mathew gives the following account.  After 93 years of being without a priest (after the death of St. Thomas) a non-Christian magician called ‘Manikkabashar’ appeared who attempted to wean Christians in Mylapore away from the faith.  Those who were faithful fled to Malabar and were received by their brethren. But these hundred and sixty odd families had no priests or leaders.  At this time the Metropolitan of Edessa had a dream about their plight which he narrated to the catholicos of the East, who then addressed a great multitude of the faithful, of whom many were bishops and merchants.  A certain Thomas from Jerusalem said that he had heard of Malabar and he was sent by the Catholicos to visit the place and report back.  Upon hearing his report, the Catholicos sent him back with priests and deacons, men, women and children from Jerusalem, Baghdad and Nineveh.  They landed in Maliamkara in 345 CE.  The Christians in Kerala welcomed them and all of them proceeded to meet “Sharkun”, the king of all Malabar.  He then gave them royal honors and complied with all their wishes. These grants were recorded on copper plates.   As a part of this grant, they proceeded to build a church at Kodungallur, and a township emerged there with 472 families. 

A late 18th century anonymous account has a slightly different version of this story.  According to this St. Thomas had ordained priests from four principal families of the region -  Sankuri, Palamittam, Kali and Kaliave – whom he had baptized.  This was in 52 CE.  However the community began to decline as it lacked successors to the bishop. This was remedied by the “rich and zealous” merchant Cnai Thoma [Thomas of Cana] who returned to his homeland in Babylonia and brought with him one bishop and two priests, who were well versed in the languages of the Rite (Syriac and Chaldaic).

This version deals more with how the St. Thomas Christians came to be within the dominion of the Eastern Syrian church.  While it is not clear when East Syrian prelates began to come to India, certain reconstructions of Church history in Kerala date it back to the 3rd century CE.  From then until about the 9th century it is possible that there was a steady flow of prelates from Eastern Syria to India, even as the rest of the Church hierarchy would clearly have been Indian,  as attested by the Portuguese.  The complex history of the development of the ancient Syrian Christian church, described pithily by Podipara as ‘Hindu in culture, Christian in religion, and Syro Oriental in worship’, once again has to be told another day.

In a third account documented in the early 19th century by Ward, one of the officers of the survey department in Travancore, the story is almost completely transformed. This narrative is said to have been in the Lebbi (probably Syriac) language but was explained to Ward in Tamil as follows:

‘At a former time seven persons of a strange religious persuasion came to Travancore; among whom the name Mar Thomas occurs.  The king of the country had previously received some admonitions respecting them in a dream. They called on the king to embrace their system, and to allow them to build places for their mode of worship.  The king demurred to their claims and said these must be proved.  He also summoned a council of Brahmans, enquiring if the new system ought to be received: who replied most certainly not.  The foreign persons ascribed to themselves the faculty of retaining the soul (when departed from a body) in the air above, and of recalling it, so as to reexamine the body; and, as stated, gave the proof of this power in the case of one among themselves.  The king, however, resisted their claims.  Soon after the king’s younger brother died; whereupon the recently arrived strangers told the king that if he would build seven churches in different places they would restore their brother to life.  The king made the promise, and the body of this brother became re-animated, awaking as if out of a sleep. In consequence both the king, and his brother, adopted the new system, and along with them 64 householders with their families received the initiatory rite of baptism.’

After this is a detailing of disputes within the community; and an account of the building of the first  seven churches.  This account too mentions ‘Manicavasavar’, referred to as “a person who chanted panegyrics, came to ‘Malayalam’ and disseminated the Saiva five-lettered system; teaching to swallow the Saiva compound of five substances; and to use the Vibhuthi or sacred ashes. He drew away several families”. It goes on to say that the head of the Christians received various privileges and immunities from Cheraman Perumal, who always directed the election of the Metran.

The traditions of the St. Thomas Christians point to a history of unconditional acceptance and the granting of extended privileges which covered religious (church building) and economic (land grants; establishing of a town) interests.  The relationship is established between the king and the leader of the community; while in these narratives, the king is not often mentioned (or else has an unidentifiable name), at least in the  third narrative one encounters mention of Cheraman Perumal.  Kodungallur once again is [one of] the principal sites of settlement.

The two instances that could suggest sources of threat to the community are both interesting – 1) of ‘Manicavasavar’ (or the Shaiva saint Manicavaccacar) attempting to win converts to Christianity back into the Shaivite fold and the 2) of Brahmins refusing permission to the king to convert (in the 3rd narrative) both point to interesting symbolic and historical issues that shall be discussed later.

If we examine the principle themes and motifs in these traditions, especially with reference to religious identity, we see that these knit together narratives of a favorable arrival, prosperous settlement, as well as moments of stress and conflict that affect the internal ordering of communities as much as the relations between them.   In almost a parallel to the Mosaic tradition in West Asia, of which the three religions were inheritors, in Kerala too, the origin myths of the Jews, Syrian Christians and Mappilla Muslims share repetitive motifs in terms of travel, arrival at the same city (Kodungallur) and a royal welcome granting them economic and religious freedom.

What complicates the story is the relationship of  Islam as the third religion of the Book, and one that had a higher status than the other two (in Kerala, the Mappillas refer to the Quran as the Nalam Vedam or the 4th Veda, the others being the Jewish and Christian texts).  By explicitly situating the origin myth of Islam within the existing tradition of origin of Judaism and Christianity (and a similar arrival in Kerala), and then ousting them from royal favor, we find an assertive statement of Islam, directed towards the other two Semitic traditions that had already found space within Kerala.  That story I promise to continue. Do watch this space.

G. Arunima is Associate Professor, Women’s Studies Programme, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

A Life Less Ordinary

Yajnaseni Chakraborty

Her tiny, birdlike frame seems lost in the embrace of a large, plush sofa in an anteroom of the business centre at the Oberoi Grand. But Nadine Gordimer still spells personality with a capital P. At 84, she is a beautiful woman, her delicate face framed by silver grey hair, her eyes a clear blue-black. I have been warned that she may terminate the interview if she doesn’t like the questions (she hates interviews anyway), so of course my list of questions seems totally inadequate.

Besides, she has fixed me with a firm stare and announced that she refuses interviews that aren’t recorded. “I want you to write what I have said,” she tells me softly but clearly, with just a trace of her South African lilt. “Not what you think I’ve said, and I talk quickly, too.” I assure her I will faithfully write down every word, and she looks doubtful for a moment before compressing her lips and signaling me to get on with it. So I nervously do. Because Nadine Gordimer the anti-apartheid activist is so much part of Nadine Gordimer the writer, I start off asking her about the battles she has fought, and continues to fight. “I played a small role. I didn’t go to jail, as many of my comrades did. I went as far as my courage would allow,” she says. “You see, I am first of all a writer, I was born that way, but I am also a human being.” In a lecture delivered in Kolkata the previous evening, Gordimer has alluded to the moral and social responsibility of the writer, and when the question comes up again, now, she carefully dissociates such responsibility from “propaganda”.

She categorises her writings alongside those of Athol Fugard and Andre Brink and Es’kia Mphahlele (which she pronounces ‘Empashlele’, and when I imitate her correctly, I earn the verbal equivalent of a pat on the back). “We were living at a time when we had to write the truth, the bits that were never reported in the newspapers. But then, governments never listen to writers.” Evidently they do, considering the bans imposed on three of her novels by the apartheid government. “I’m glad they were banned. No bans would have been worrying,” she says wryly.

By now, Gordimer has unbent enough to discuss any possible crisis of faith that she may have faced, and I feel I am allowed to ask who she turned to during those crises. She agrees she is an atheist with left-wing sympathies, explains that the source of her faith is “our responsibility to each other”, and then wistfully turns to her favourite poet W.B. Yeats: “What do we know but that we face/ One another in this lonely place?”

The question of ‘responsibility’ is evidently a significant one in her life. It is the single most important reason why she never really considered leaving South Africa. Her late husband, Reinhardt Cassirer, belonged to a notable family of Berlin Jews. He arrived in South Africa as a refugee from Nazi Germany, and studied in London and Heidelberg. “He wasn’t Africa born and bred like me, and he had a nostalgic love for London, I suppose, so we did toy with the idea of living there for a while, but in the end I realized I was too attached to Africa,” she smiles.

 As a white South African who established deeply personal bonds with the anti-apartheid movement, Gordimer nevertheless remains reserved and unsentimental about the risks she must have run as a supporter of the once outlawed African National Congress. But her face lights up in a rare smile when she recalls the experience of standing in a mixed-race queue to vote in her country’s first post-apartheid election. “It was the best experience of my life,” she says. Better than the Nobel Prize? “Yes it was, really.”

 Mixed race brings us to the question of Indians in South Africa, who, Gordimer notes approvingly, did not flee the country as those in Kenya did. “They stayed and went to prison,” she smiles again. And Kenya, the home of Vidiadhar Surajprasad Naipaul’s forefathers, naturally brings us to why she has called his Bend in the River “a racist book”. I point out that her remark is likely to be quoted out of context to indicate the man rather than his book. “You think so?” she replies. “I’m sorry to hear that. He’s a great writer, which is why the book disappointed me.” And then she adds, with no real remorse, “Maybe I shouldn’t have said what I did, then.”

It’s nearing the end of my allotted time, and Gordimer hasn’t glanced at her watch more than once, purely out of habit, I assume. We’ve covered a lot of ground, talking about the small but growing Black South African middle class with particular reference to the software industry, the Indian middle class too (“I loved Mr Varma’s Great Indian Middle Class”), the shanties outside Kolkata airport, the plight of poor, unemployed young people who take to violence (not least in South Africa), why the South African cricket team may never have the required share of Black players, and why South African president in waiting Jacob Zuma’s motto is: Bring Me My AK-47 (“he doesn’t say it much now, though”). She has shown me a sketch her granddaughter made in Mumbai (“she sketches beautifully”), and a newspaper clipping about parallels between India’s long-standing democracy and South Africa’s still-nascent one.

I try to introduce Taslima Nasreen into the conversation, considering Gordimer has been on various anti-censorship boards, but she doesn’t respond, as I had hoped she would, with a brief tirade. Instead, her face aglow, she holds forth on how South Africa no longer has censorship, “except if someone actively preaches violence”. The pride on her face as she says this is proof enough, one feels, of a life less ordinary. Thank God she liked the questions.

(This was recorded in November 2008)

Yajnaseni Chakraborty is Features Editor, Hindustan Times.

The Blind Art of the Concrete

Pothik Ghosh

The real when it has reached the mind, is already not real any more. Our too thoughtful, too intelligent eye.

—Robert Bresson, Notes on the Cinematographer

Modern man is cursed with too much of seeing. His every waking moment is suffused and saturated with objects, images, concepts and signs. Such is this profusion of forms that he neither has time nor the inclination to really see what he has to see. And he is oblivious of the virtues of blindness. But can blindness be a virtue? The work of painter Benodebehari Mukherjee – who had a congenitally defective vision, went completely blind in 1957 aged 53, and yet continued to paint for another 23 years – alludes to the visual richness that blindness, and its seeking, can sometimes yield.

There is a lot of variety in Mukherjee’s art. But what brings them together is the unity of his aesthetic approach, which sought tirelessly to overcome the world of objects and optical verisimilitude and penetrate their essence. Much of his work, post blindness, is characterised by an almost complete disappearance of opticality, with objects being reduced to their archetypes. Not surprisingly, the human and animal figures of his paper-cuts and collages lack eyes. Two of his post-’57 lithographs – Curd Seller and Kitchen – are examples of how objects are merely alibis for the artist to explore various interactions among certain essential forms and structures.

 But his creations, even before he lost his sight, are marked by a struggle to escape objects and their sheer optical presence. From the very beginning, Mukherjee, as his art indicates, was interested not in things but in relationships among them. Even his self-portraits explore relationships between physiognomy and the character of his inner being.

Mukherjee was also drawn to forces that constitute figures and objects rather than the finished ‘things’ themselves. His Artist Observing a Frog is more about capturing the state of two human figures looking at a frog than the visual event per se. This yearning for non-opticality brings Mukherjee close to Anglo-Irish painter Francis Bacon, in spite of their distance in space and tradition. The field of Bacon’s paintings, as philosopher Gilles Deleuze has accurately pointed out, lacks depth, and he situates his figures in a way that it appears they are dissolving. Clearly then, Mukherjee, an important member of the Bengal school, was not the only one to have quested after artistic blindness: a metaphor for capturing the unseen in art that is all about seeing. But his loss of vision became a dramatic, physical culmination of this search.

Orhan Pamuk, who is preoccupied by this aesthetic of ‘non-seeing’ in his My Name is Red, gives a detailed account of the tradition of blindness-seeking among the 12th-13th century masters of Perso-Islamic miniatures. They considered blindness to be the supreme accomplishment of their artistic métier so much so they would often pierce their own eyes with needles specially designed for the purpose. For them, blindness implied the victory of sacred timeless vision over profane human gaze.

The human eye is a compulsive ejaculator of meaning. It is also a repository of pre-conceived notions and ideas. Objects are rendered meaningful only within cages of concepts and forms cast on to them. There is no room for the object to show itself autonomously. Blindness, in such circumstances, is the decimation of the predetermined gaze, if only to set the object free. It is driven by, what French philosopher Gaston Bachelard chose to call, “material imagination”, something that he contrasted with what he called “formal imagination”. The former seeks to shun all formal preconceptions to experience the world directly in its essential and elemental materiality.

Mukherjee’s attempt to penetrate the visual realm to get to the essences chimes with Swiss painter Paul Klee’s. The deliberate infantilism and primitivity in Klee’s paintings allude to the elemental world beyond the realm of our fabricated modern reality. Klee’s search for essences was driven by a desire to go back to the roots of the “art image”.

Mukherjee’s ‘blind search’ resonates with the ancient mystic traditions of Bengal: of Ramakrishna, the Bauls and Lalanpanthis, Chaitanya and Aatish Dipankara, the 10th-11th century Buddhist monk from erstwhile east Bengal, who journeyed to Tibet to revive Tantric Buddhism. Such mysticism emphasised the dissolution of the individual and his gaze into the world. The idea of non-seeing, which emerged from such mysticism, is not as simple as seeing or saying nothing. It is, in fact, seeing and saying much more than eyes and language can afford. It is faith, not in the sense of submitting to an impenetrable reality, but a state of absolute transparency between the human being and his world so as to preclude any attempt by the former to invade and know the latter.

Mukherjee’s decision to paint the 8-foot high, 80-foot long Life of Medieval Saints mural on the three walls of Visva Bharati’s Hindi Bhavan was not pure chance. The mural, a seamless tapestry of Surdas, Kabir, Ravidas, Tulsidas, Guru Gobind Singh and other medieval Bhakti figures, is an expression of his historical vision that has little to do with the nationalistic grand narratives of his time. In its compositeness, the mural is shot through with the history of Bhakti, not only in the choice of subject but, more importantly, in its vision. History in this mural – which brings together the lives of various medieval saints separated in time and space – is not a mere chronology of events that were seen by human eyes as having unfolded in time. It is an experience, elusive to human eyes, of a timeless emotion. The emotion of “bhakti”.

In his Shilpa Jigyasa (Art’s Quest), Mukherjee privileges the world of the primitive anonymous craftsman, ready to dissolve into his tradition, over that of the modern artist with his individual’s ego and gaze. However, his return to the ‘blind’ tradition of the artisan was much too ironical, and thus modern, to replicate the ‘repetitiveness’ of artisanal craftsmanship in art. It was all about reclaiming the pre-modern ethos of being one with the world.

That helped him free both his memory and imagination from the culturally ingrained habits of seeing and allowed the visual world in his imagination to be mediated by the other four senses. Mukherjee ardently embraced such synaesthesia. He famously distinguished colours by touch after he went blind. His works of that period, even while being visual, have a distinctly tactile quality, too.

Funes, the Memorious, written by Argentine fabulist Jorge Luis Borges—who like Mukherjee continued to work even after he went blind—is an acutely prescient celebration of blindness. The eponymous protagonist of the fable, who is able to remember every small visual detail after a physically crippling accident, is, however, unable to think. That’s because thought is generalisation, which entails forgetting much of what we have sensed. Funes, for Borges, is an arch-example of a human being whose imagination and memory are condemned to the prison of the visual. The ‘blind’ art of Benodebehari Mukherjee, on the other hand, is an intimation of how human beings could one day become more human, and free!

 Pothik Ghosh is one of the Editors of the South Asian Leftist web-journal Radical Notes.

Liturgical Architecture

Dennis R. Mcnamara

We live in an era that is not known for making beautiful churches. In fact, the sensus fidelium seems to indicate that something is indeed severely wrong with the unprofane architecture erected in the last few decades. Sometimes modern churches claim a vague Christian symbolism or association through shape or general motif, which is nonetheless found largely unsatisfactory. In other cases, purposeful attempts are made to avoid eschatological sacramentality. Many churches of the last half century seem to live up quite well to Hans Urs von Balthasar’s (who, along with Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan, sought to offer an intellectual, faithful response to theological modernism) claim, adapted from Karl Barth, that without enthralling pangs of  beauty, theology does not inspire. If it is in the very nature of beauty to transport us to rupture, Balthasar asks, how could we then possibly dispense with the concept of the beautiful that is sharp and yet tangible, something that abstract modernism undermines?

This description certainly fits much of the church architecture of recent years. Yet, an unconsidered return to the Romantic historicism of nineteenth-century architecture cannot be a solution to today’s problems, despite the calls for traditional architecture appearing today. Even Ralph Adams Cram, twentieth century’s great proponent of a renewal of liturgical architecture through a return to medieval precedent, critiqued the nineteenth-century revivalists for their history-driven formalism. He called the Modernist “revolt” against the period’s parade of styles a laudable thing, but could not agree with its solutions, since “they were measurably inferior to what they have decried.”   We find ourselves in a similar dilemma. A return to a purely Romantic approach to architecture is not a true solution though the romantic spirituality of the Christian artists and aesthetic philosophers of the last two centuries (from 1860 to the present) is strongly brought out by their preserving a sense of the unity of beauty and religion, art and religion, when they had almost no support from theology.

A Balthasarian approach to liturgical architecture can avoid the pitfalls of both Romanticism and Modernism. To canonize a particular “style” of architecture only because of a historical association is an architectural aesthetic theology. However, the Modernist denial of historical styles precisely because of their historicity is also an architectural aesthetic theology. A Balthasarian solution beckons: begin by conceiving liturgical architecture as the form of Christ (Christus totus) in his sacramental, ecclesiological dimension in the liturgy. Liturgical architecture can therefore best be evaluated in light of its ability to bear the Christian message, that is, the “ontological secret” of the liturgical event, which by definition reveals beauty and results in joyfully rapturous discovery.

Balthasar writes about the apologetic nature of his “fundamental theology,” saying “the heart of the matter should be the question: ‘How does God’s revelation confront man in history? How is it perceived?’” One could ask the same question in architectural terms: “How does God’s revelation confront man in liturgical architecture? How is it perceived?” Here we have an architecture that is claimed to reveal the divine, and that, on the basis of this claim, demands that we should believe and therefore expend our resources in a certain way despite the clear, rationalistic overarching demands of economy, functionalist utility, and the Zeitgeist. What basis acceptable to the liturgical-architectural establishment can we give these authoritative claims?

Although the answer may seem redundant at first, it is worth stating that liturgical architecture is first and foremost liturgical, a bearer of the mystery of the anticipated eschatology of the Banquet of the Lamb. Balthasar speaks of the Church as an “event” in which the “power of the Christ-form expresses and impresses itself,” in which “the Lord becomes present in the assembly manifesting himself within it.” Both the Eucharist and the scriptures are described as making no sense unless enjoyed as a means of “impressing the Christ-form in the hearts of men.” Liturgical architecture can be understood in a similar manner. Liturgical architecture (and of course, figural art), as symbol of the Wedding Feast of the Lamb of the Heavenly Jerusalem, would make no sense without the Christian’s partaking in the invisible liturgy that it represents.

As part of an architectural theological aesthetic, liturgical architecture is not primarily an example of the trends popular in Architectural Record, a neutral setting for the horizontal activities of an improperly understood “People of God,” or a “skin for liturgical action . . . which need not look like anything else.” Rather, liturgical architecture should be capable of becoming part of the cluster of symbols that make up the liturgical rite. In other words, it should be considered sacramental, making present by way of foretaste the Wedding Feast of the Lamb in the Heavenly Jerusalem. “If beauty is conceived of transcendentally, then its definition must be derived from God himself.”

This emphasis on the sacramental, eschatological nature of Christian worship and its liturgical architecture finds a decided sympathy with Balthasar’s writings. The liturgy is certainly one place where the encounter with Christ is made available to us. In fcat, liturgy is made up of two distinct movements. “First God is made present through words, signs, and symbols,” then “people respond to God’s presence in their midst through word, song, and action.” This second movement is not a separate event, but a spontaneous response to the first. If architecture is part of the system of symbols that make God known, then it is not simply the neutral beige background common to the post-conciliar era, but part of the “eschatological orientation” that “endeavors to make the divine present through a type of eschatological anticipation.”

Through its positive, beautiful images and sounds, and by its confident celebration of the eschatological banquet, it steps beyond the present-day signs of the kingdom’s distance and anticipates the time of the kingdom’s fullness. Thus, liturgical celebrations avoid the chaos, contingency, moral confusion, and existential anxieties that mark our transient lives. Liturgy needs the kind of eschatological anticipation implied by these characteristics if it is to offer the believer an encounter with God, since most do not have the contemplative vision to find God in the type of muck found in our everyday lives. If the salvific narrative, the “theo-drama,” is to captivate us and elicit our response, we must encounter it in its fullness so that we can perceive its divine rendering.

These claims are easily transferable to liturgical architecture, which, along with its art, should present this eschatological dimension of the liturgy. The altar should be read more as the banqueting table of the Lord than merely a community table. The figural imagery is more than abstract mood-evoking shapes or simple devotional imagery; it makes sacramentally present the Christus totus, including the heavenly assembly. The church building can present an image of the heavenly banquet in a building that images the Heavenly Jerusalem.

# Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, vol. 1: Seeing the Form (San Francisco: Ignatius Press/Crossroads, 1983).

# Balthasar’s well-known writing on aesthetic theology and theological aesthetics can be applied to architecture directly. While a theological aesthetics begins with God’s transcendent beauty and his desire to allow man to participate in his divine life, “aesthetic theology,” by contrast, begins with the creaturely concept of rupture and attempts to universalize it.

Denis R. Mcnamara is assistant director and faculty member at the LiturgicalInstitute of the University of Saint Mary of the Lake/Mundelein Seminary in Chicago.

Material Love

 

Nandini Chandra and Jesse Ross Knutson

Indeed, love is a many splendoured thing! Different categories of age and class appropriate romantic literature offer a guide to this tremendous variety. There is a virtual caste/class system operating in the love industry whereby some people feel real/authentic love in contrast to more debased others. But despite this hierarchy, love is for everyone, like in the Mira Nair film Monsoon Wedding. What is shared across this class system is a desire for another human being for sure. But the sexual feeling aroused in romantic hetero-normative love is a specialized one not to be confused with sex qua sex. The sex here has to be constantly negotiated and differentiated to a point where it is no longer sex, but a suitably inflected synonym for it. So while the Valentine’s day lovers may relate to each other via loud commodities, like heart shaped balloons, Archies’ greeting cards and red roses that have been frozen for weeks before February 14-the magic date, our subdued low-profile love in defiance of this blatant commodification is no less a type in the many splendoured index file of the culture industry.

It was the Marxist theorist Theodor Adorno who pointed out that the dominant form of love under capitalism is romance. His exact words: love downgraded to romance! What is so debased about romance? Is there nothing beautiful or transgressive about it? How do we make sense of our defiance of love and, defiance in love in the same breath? One minute we are distancing ourselves from a love that needs the aids of the shopping plaza, and the next minute we are buying more things to shout to the world that we will love despite all the sri ram senas and the khap panchayats. Is that schizo or not? The answer must lie in the deep structure of alienated love that affects us all whether we like to acknowledge it or not.  By alienated love is meant a love that has been taken away and then sold back to us, a love appropriated from our bodies’ capacity for sensual pleasure and then returned as a mechanism to mediate that sensuality—ways of loving, ways of kissing, ways of fighting and ways of making up via the market place that any reader of Cosmo or popular ads can immediately appreciate. This is not merely a market place of things, but also a market place of ideas and we would do well to believe Marquez, when he reiterates that there is a lot of cross-fertilization between the high and the low.

At the same time, sexuality—the embodied experience of love—cannot be completely regulated by the moral police. The very fact that they are trying so hard must be reason to explore what it is that is getting their goat.  For one, when people feel pleasure, it is a dangerous thing because they allow their bodies to come out of fear and start questioning the repression that is cajoled into them. Who to love, how to love, who absolutely not to love are some of the edicts laid down by the enemies of love. But the defenders of love, the liberal bourgeoisie, who have surrendered to the lure of the market and allowed their daughters and sisters to enter dating sites, marriage bureaus, internet chat lines, are not so different either. These exchanges of love are rife with caste and gotra markers apart from an implicit injunction for class and religious inbreeding. It is therefore important see the defenders or tolerators of love and the enemies of love not as opposite camps, but allied (maybe disparate) units trying to come to grips with the new products of sexuality, inaugurated by advanced capital. While the fanatics are merely crying foul at the loss of their hold over the women who are daring to marry outside caste and religion, the more entrenched capitalist class, who embrace modernity with riders, want to teach women lessons in self-censorship, so that they know the boundaries within which their pleasure is permissible. After all, romantic love is not necessarily liberating. It works very much within the auspices of patriarchy and accepts women’s subservience to men. Given the uneven development of capitalism, what we have are different faces of the same thing, rather than modern love versus barbaric opposition to it. The sooner we understand the different encroachments upon our sexuality, the better we will be able to fight the constant attempts to incorporate it for the love industry. For ultimately we need love—not for happy little families who can watch telly on increasingly upgraded technology, serving up programmes that perpetually leave them on the brink of a promised pleasure so close and yet so far away—but instead to create a pleasure that can truly belong to us, and then to learn to mould the world in the image of this pleasure.      

The question is not the content of this pleasure, the alternately authentic or debased love that we started with, and whether one should love this way or that.  The question is the trajectory. The violence against those who would love in a socially unsanctioned or defiant way (which we can now begin to recognize as fascist) comes from precisely this: the uncharted territory where an economy of unpredictable, creative pleasure might lead.  It could lead to the demand for a world of pleasure, a world in the image of desire, with full stomachs and moist throats, with freely moving bodies, and social relations that we want and invent, instead of those that we suffer for lack of any other available option.  Sexual repression and frustration teach one to live with lack and invest one’s libidinal energies in the reproduction of lack that capitalism represents.  Socialism put simply would start with the reproduction of plenty, which the spark of pleasure in its unpredictable eddies might begin to capture in microcosm before the pigs are ready. 

Nandini Chandra is Assistant Professor, Department of English, University of Delhi.

Jesse Ross Knutson is Postdoctoral Fellow, South & South Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

Politics and Ethics in Communist Practice:From the Margins of the Indian Left

Rajarshi Dasgupta

Let me begin by explaining the subtitle, which should be relatively easier than the title. Who or what exactly belongs to the margins of communist politics in India? First, let me tell you about certain practices – activities and forms of activism that are no longer paid much attention practically nor thought through in theoretical terms by the dominant communist parties today. In fact, it is doubtful how far communists will currently like to identify the core of their work with such activities. Secondly, I am going to look briefly at a history, or rather micro histories of a movement, consigned to anodyne hagiographies in places like West Bengal, where communist memories primarily dwell on the heroic nostalgia of creating a hegemonic regime. Thirdly, my attempt is to tackle these issues and frame them conceptually in such a manner, which the available communist vocabulary does not allow. It does not possess the resources, which are necessary for a critical hermeneutic of the political and the ethical in the field of everyday practice. That is why I would like to turn to a different set of categories and reading strategies sidestepping the familiar Marxist methodologies here. But is it not paradoxical to study the communist movement in terms that are distant and alien from its own forms of discourse? I would say no, for we are going to study these very forms of discourse – the practice of putting them together, constituting them, building them word by word, act by act, point by point.

The specific problem I have in mind is the practice of speaking the truth – its implications for the self and its relation to other/s.  There is little doubt that the question of relating with the other is of paramount importance to a communist. I have discussed on other occasions  how an entire set of maneuvers  – physical and mental – ascetic exercises were geared to a passage of ‘becoming declassed’ which ensured a normative identification with the masses – the workers and peasants as communists saw them. This was an extremely fraught process – what we usually describe as rooted in the ordinary people, having to compete with other models like that of the satyagrahi, not always successfully but often ending up in a subterranean conversation. Unlike Gandhi’s soulforce and karmayoga, the Indian communists traded in historical materialism and labor. But the question of speaking the truth was never too far from the political performances across the spectrum. How did communists see the status of truth-speaking as an activity intrinsic to politics? What were the kinds of truths invested in such contexts? This is where we must leave the customary communist pedagogy behind and look for other kinds of truth and, as we shall see, other kinds of relation to truth.

Speaking the first type of Truth: Utopian

Broadly, I would say there are three significant kinds of speaking the truth in communist practice. The first kind of truth is very strictly speaking what is not true in an objective sense – that is, it is not out there in the reality around us but symptomatic of a possible future – a truth that is teleological – that states what is to come as per the law of history tomorrow. But this does not mean it is a determinist thing, a rhetorical article of mechanical faith in progress. It is in fact a far more unpredictable and complicated move that arises out of trying to understand the other.  And its function is to fiercely combat accepted wisdoms, in particular, the cynicism of the common sense that wryly explains why certain things never change in a desirable manner, why the status quoist inertia finally comes to win the day. This is of course the truth about utopia – which is not based on the existing state of knowledge but on its profound subversion – the place of an ‘as if’ which breaks down and reassembles the sense of reality in a way that makes it more meaningful and productive. Let me give you a concrete example.  For much of the middle of twentieth century communist activists and intellectuals have racked their minds to understand why the peasants – reduced to dying of hunger in thousands in the infamous famine of forties – never rebelled. Was the very impulse of rebellion basically alien to their class character as peasants? The question is actually not very distant for us at a time of mass suicides and predatory dispossession of land today. However, one of the ways in which the communists sought to address the question is to search for something like an organic intellectual – a poor peasant cum Marxist theorist who would be able to answer the riddle. The question took many shapes within the communist movement and became the subject matter of a number of cultural productions – plays, poetry and short stories. I want to draw your attention to one particular short story, titled ‘Chhiniye Khayni Kano?’ roughly translatable as ‘Why did they not loot and eat?’, given the well-known fact that there was widespread hoarding of foodgrains at this point. The communist author of the story, Manik Bandyopadhyay, plotted the story around a conversation between a bhadralok babu communist who wonders if the peasant is submissive by nature and an old robber, Jogi dakaat, who explains to the babu how hungry bodies can only rebel after a square meal and how they give up when the hunger multiplies: there is no energy left, the body survives at the bare limits of life. The important point to note is not this reason that is no doubt worth serious consideration but the character of Jogi dakaat. What we are looking at in such a character is precisely that organic peasant intellectual that was not there to be found in reality. Jogi dakaat is more of a horizon than an esoteric social bandit dear to Eric Hobsbawm. He is coming from the future into a short story that turns the idiom of realism into configuring a desired possibility, no longer unreal, any more than socialism remains unrealistic.  This then is the first type of truth speaking that marked the communist relation to the other – not like others before us but what others coming after us can teach us about truth. It is their truth that one must work to articulate.

Speaking the second type of Truth: Governmental

In order to be a communist one had to practice speaking another kind of truth – this time extremely grounded, objective and factually as accurate as possible. This is the truth about oneself – or rather, the raw self, the flesh and blood historical individual ‘I’. Everything – every little habit, one’s height, one’s voice, one’s social skills, political education, favorite sport, romantic life, experience of travel, capacity to melt in the crowd and so on are worthy material of deposition in this register and nothing can be left to discretion or privacy. Can you take a hard life full of drudgery? Are you given to day-dreaming and are you lazy? Can you keep your cool under daily panic? What class of coach or train have you been usually traveling? Are you punctual? Do you have a sense of humor? Such are the questions asked in a cyclostyled questionnaire meant for party organizers issued on 31st March 1941 circulated only among unit secretaries, under the title – ‘Before you go UG we want to know you in the raw’.  This obligation to provide knowledge to the party included information ranging from the sublime to the ridiculous, the questions reading at times like an interrogation, sometimes like an absurd fiction, but always very systematic, purposive and comprehensive – much like a panopticon disciplining apparatus, that individuates, redistributes, weighs and recirculates people like proper objects – an ordering rationality difficult not to see as governmental, while at the same time, familial in its affective tenor and tutoring in its vocation. Consider questions like: ‘Are you quick at making decisions (any kind: whether you are going to have a bath or not, what you are going to cook, whether you are going to have a meeting or a conference or are going to call it off, etc.?) Or are you a victim of indecision?’

However, I think the crucial question is as follows: ‘Are you self-critical at all (self-critical is underlined)? Can you stand a jharr (acute crisis) without getting demoralized for days? Do you admit your mistakes in the abstract or try to work up all its implications and to correct them?’ We should not miss this either: ‘Have you fallen in love? With a comrade? Are you in love with a comrade now? Give his/her P.Name.’ However, the most important set of questions are given under a heading: ‘the Party in Your Life’: ‘What was your political life before you came towards us? When did you start working with the Party? When did you join the Party? … (Finally,) How has the Party changed you as a PERSON? Do you remain roughly what you were before you became a Communist OR has the Party changed your entire outlook and your habits, methods of thinking, character?’

Here is then the way of ascertaining the extent to which the party is constituting a practical self – one might say of the Aristotelian type, but then again, the place of party as the real sovereign authority is also very clear from the last bunch of questions. The party converts people who go into UG in such ways that being communist moves very close to becoming a law-abiding citizen, or for that mater, becoming a soldier who observes orders without any grumble or scruples. And what kind of truth does such a relation produce. I would like to say it is a truth that constantly self-abnegates and governs oneself – a truth speaking that is similar to self-invigilation. But its main task is to produce the interpellation of a collective body, indeed a body politic of new kind that establishes the party as the sovereign para-state whose members are relentlessly self-correcting and must be brutally self-critical insofar as and when they are in conflict with the party.

Speaking the third type of Truth: Parrhesia

If the second type of truth speaking is comparable to a series of confessions/depositions about oneself under an invisible oath and before a visible edifice of authority, if it is about the scraping and thinning of the self to a virtual transparency, it is fundamentally about learning to become governable. There is however another type of truth speaking that runs directly counter to this practice, to which I shall turn as the concluding note to this discussion. This third type of truth speaking makes visible and brings into play a new factor in the relation between the self and other/s, which is the factor of fear – the factor of threat, of punishment and of course, ultimately, of death. The moot question to engage the communists in this register is how to speak the truth in a situation where the addressee is capable of inflicting retribution while the speaker is vulnerable to potential injury.  I would like to consider this as the most critical of all the three relationships to truth we have discussed so far. This is where the political and the ethical are intensified to a pitch that is difficult to surpass because, to put it simply, one might die for the truth one utters.  An important point to note in the activity of truth speaking under these conditions is often a scandalous overture, calling into question the norms that govern the dominant rules of discourse. The scandalous overture multiplies the risk involved and so unexpectedly it produces a kind of critical pause in the interlocution. This pause is where the truth can unfold in a manner that would refuse to go away even if the addressee decides to injure. In fact the pause becomes a moment of theatre, an act in a farce, a scene that shatters the operatic height of the meeting with power to sober up sensibilities with an ironic laughter, obviously at one’s own expense, but a laughter that makes truth a language of dissidence, and which gestures towards a degree zero of ungovernability. Let me illustrate this with an excerpt from a verse by Samar Sen, an iconic communist poet.

I am not a romantic poet; I am Marxist.
[…]
…Materialist good sense allows me today

To sail comfortably with my feet on two boats
Bourgeois butter and working class milk
Someday will surely bring fantastic fame

To this providential poet, I believe.[i][1]

What is remarkable about this excerpt is that it seems to add a new dimension to the practice of self-criticism. If this was really meant to be a deposition it shows a delightful irreverence of tone that does not fit into the box of confession. As speech activity it is strident, provocative and taking risk in a way that is both dangerous and tempting for others: can the reader – you or me – take similar risk? For that is the secret wager of such lines that hook a self turned inside out like a steak hung at the butcher’s.

I would like to describe what happens in this case as a parrhesiastic contract, a game of telling truth about oneself and thereby forcing the hand of the other. This relation to truth is very different from Gandhi’s experiments with truth. It is less a matter of realizations and more of a certain kind of speech activity, setting up such a relationship with the speaker that his speech cannot hide anything from the others. Unlike any metaphysical moral imperative, we must remember it is a game of interlocutors – a game of high risk, ultimately having nothing to do with morality in a conventional sense, but everything to do with power, and with the ethical. It is the activity of speaking truth, what the Greeks referred to in antiquity as parrhesiazesthai, which shows how one can speak the truth without fear, however disagreeable, to one’s comrade bosses, old and new.      

1] Samar Sen, ‘Baaishey June’ in Samar Sener Kabita, p. 125, written around 1943-44. (trans. mine)

Rajarshi Dasgupta is Assistant Professor, Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.